This dvar Torah is based on notes taken 18 years ago from a shmuz given by Rav Moshe Chait zt”l, Rosh Yeshiva of Chofetz Chaim Yerushalayim.
The special portion read for Parshas HaChodesh this week, begins: “The Lord spoke to
Moses and to Aaron in the land of Egypt, saying, This month shall be to you the head of
the months; to you it shall be the first of the months of the year” (Shemos 12:1, 2).
The first Rashi on the Torah says that this pasuk is referring to sanctifying the new
month and should have been the first thing mentioned in the Torah. The first month
should have been Nissan.
This mitzvah was told over in Egypt because it was needed, even though Egypt was a
place of spiritual uncleanliness.
The Sforno on the second pasuk says: “’This month shall be to you the beginning of
months.’ Henceforth the months (of the year) shall be yours, to do with them as you will.
During the bondage, however, your days (time) did not belong to you but (were used) to
work for others and fulfill their will, therefore ‘It shall be the first month of the year to
you’ .For in (this month) your existence as a people of (free) choice began.”
The Sforno seems to be saying that this (time) is your life’s possession, and you can do
what you want with it; but if others control you, then your time is taken by others.
Slavery, which usurps your time, is like taking a life. Your whole life depends on time.
The Jews weren’t just slaves, they were non-existent. If the free choice of using your time
is taken away from you, or you give it away, then you are non-existent.
Time, according to the Sforno, is a measurement which has a beginning; but the
beginning is when you choose to do it. The Sforno is explaining when time is yours. The
reality of when doesn’t matter; when you choose is what matters.
Some people realize the importance of time but others don’t. They use phrases like how
to “pass time,” “kill time,” or “waste time.”
As long as you are living a Torah life, then you are managing your time, whether by
learning, doing mitzvos, or kindness with a fellow person. The Torah can even cause
longevity of life.
A major problem is that people want to keep up with the times. But what value did you
have of time before that? Torah time is eternal. If you learn it, it is yours.
The point is: to what extent do we value time? This is dependent on whether we are
enslaved or not. A person that tries to keep up with the times is enslaved to time. People
that live by the Torah, its laws, and customs, control time.
A practical application of this concept in terms of learning can be seen by how much
emphasis one puts in to review; because it makes learning permanent, instead of going in
and out of learning.
Chazal say: “One is not truly free unless he is deeply involved in his Torah learning.”
People say one is free when he can choose to do nothing and waste time; however, this
person is captured by his evil inclination. He is bound by time. This person, when he
wants to start doing something, finds that it is actually harder for him.
What the Torah dictates is not a means to control you but it causes you to take control of
your life.
Torah Riddles Test #24
Question: Explain the argument between Rebbe Akiva Aiger and the Ra”n on whether nullifying chometz within a majority of non-chometz is different from nullifying sheep wool in a majority of camel wool to combine it with linen and not transgress shaatnez?
Background:
A. The Teshuvas HaRan (64) says that chometz before the time of being forbidden to own is nullified in non-chometz even though it is permitted food being mixed with permitted food. It is just like a Mishna in Kilayim 9:1 which says that sheep wool and camel mixed together, if the majority is camel wool than it can be interwoven into linen and it is not shaatnez because only wool from a sheep is forbidden to be mixed with linen and camels aren’t sheep and the sheep wool is nullified to the majority of camel wool, even if it is permissible wool being mixed with permissible wool since the sheep wool isn’t intertwined with the linen yet.
B. Rebbe Akiva Aiger says the cases are incomparable because the sheep wool has a forbidden name to it to be mixed with linen so it can be nullified in the camel wool as if it is forbidden stuff being nullified in permitted stuff. Whereas chometz has no connection to prohibition whatsoever before the forbidden time on the eve of Passover.
C. What is the reason for prohibition?
Answer: Rebbe Akiva Aiger holds the reason for prohibition by chometz is time so that is why it is different from shaatnez but the Ra”n holds the reason for prohibition is the item i.e. the chometz it is just restricted by time meaning it is only prohibited on Pesach just like shaatnez where the reason for prohibition is the sheep wool but only when mixed with linen.
Torah Riddles Test #23
Question:Why does the Rambam poskin you get makkos (lashes) if your flour ferments on Pesach or if you buy chometz on Pesach because it is a prohibition done through an action but the mitzvah of don’t covet, even if it leads to convincing the other to buy the object he covets is still not considered a prohibition done through an action and hence does not receive makkos?
Background:
A. The real prohibition by chometz is owning it which is not an action (it is a state of being) and lashes are only a punishment for prohibitive actions. However since the ownership comes through an action of baking or buying then the prohibition is considered an action (Rambam first chapter of halachic Chometz u’Matza)
B. The Rambam (Hilchos gezeila vi’aveida 1:10) poskins If a person forces someone to sell him something even if he paid a lot of money for it he still transgresses the sin of “Don’t covet” but does not receive lashes because it is a sin which is not done through an action, rather it is an emotion manifested in an action of a forced sale.
Answer: The forced sale only reveals how much one covets the other person’s object so the sin really is only the emotion but by chometz the sale or baking is the actual means to be in a state of ownership of chometz therefore the sin is a direct result of the action and punishable with lashes.
Shemini – Molding Our Future
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The Mesilas Yesharim in the first chapter, “Man’s Duty in This World,” relates: “If you look more deeply into the matter, you will see that the world was created for man’s use. In truth, man is the center of a great balance. For if he is pulled after the world and is drawn further from his Creator, he is damaged, and he damages the world with him. And if he rules over himself and unites himself with his Creator, and uses the world only to aid him in the service of his Creator, he is uplifted and the world itself is uplifted with him.” This concept is precisely illustrated by the laws of kashrus in this week’s Torah portion of Shemini.
The Medrish Rabba in this week’s Torah portion says that when the Torah says: “This is the domesticated animal [you are able to eat],” this aptly fits in with the pasuk in Mishlei which says: “Every word of God is refined” (Mishlei 30:5). Rav says that the mitzvos [commandments] were only given to the Jews in order to refine through them all the creatures in existence. Why was this done, because it says at the end of this pasuk in Mishlei: “He is a shield for all who take refuge in Him.” The Maharz”u explains that by performing mitzvos with the creatures amongst us, we are refining them to be brought into the life of the World to Come as reward for fulfilling the mitzvos [through them].
The Medrish goes on to list the ramifications of treating the creatures in this world properly. There is an eye-opening lesson that will be learnt from this part of the medrish. “Rebbe Yudan the son of Rebbe Shimon said: ‘Behemot and Leviatan shall be the beasts of contest (the show) for the righteous in the hereafter, and whoever abstains from witnessing the beast fights of the nations in this world, shall be admitted to see them. How will they be slaughtered? Behemot will chop Leviatan with its horns and rip it apart and Leviatan will chop Behemot with its fins and stab it. (To see more on Behemot vs. Leviatan click here.) The sages asked, is this a kosher slaughtering? Didn’t we learn that one can slaughter with anything at any time besides with a sickle, harvesting blade, a saw, and teeth, for they choke [the animal]. Rebbe Abba bar Kahana answered, Hashem said, ‘The Torah was established by me, so I can commence anew a Torah law from myself.’
The Yidei Moshe, explaining the last statement, says it is permissible for Hashem to slaughter with fins, but for a person, for whom the Torah was given in order to refine their hearts and to instill in them the attribute of mercy, it is forbidden to use fins because it is cruelty to animals.
The Medrish concludes with another thing which Hashem is going to provide in The Next World, which is unkosher in this world: “Rebbe Brachia said in the name of Rebbe Yitzchok that in the future Hashem will make a breakfast for His righteous servants, and anyone who did not eat carcasses (non-shechted animals) in this world will merit to eat it in the World to Come as it says, ‘The fat of carcass and the fat of an animal with a fatal disease or injury, may be used for any work, but you shall not eat it’ (Vayikra 7:24). This is in order so that you can eat it in the future, therefore Moshe warned all the Jews and said ‘this is the wild animals you can eat.’” (Click here for Hebrew text)
It is very clear from what was said earlier that Hashem gave us the mitzvos for the benefit of mankind, and indeed all of creation, in order to mold and refine us so that we will be properly prepared and deserving of The World to Come. The World to Come is one of perfection and bliss, which the beginning of the first chapter of Mesilas Yesharim describes as “rejoicing in G-D and deriving pleasure from the splendor of His Presence; for this is true joy, and the greatest pleasure that can be found. The place where this joy may truly be derived is the World to Come.”
It would seem from this medrish that there will be some level of a physical manifestation of this pleasure in the World to Come where Hashem, lihavdil, will be serving the righteous breakfast and special meat from the giant creatures, Behemot and Leviatan. (It seems obvious that this is not just figurative from the fact the medrish asks how a non-kosher shechita can be performed on the Behemot to be eaten by the righteous). What seems questionable is how Hashem will allow and even “serve” non-kosher meat; whether it is the chelev (which is non-kosher fats) of an animal who was not slaughtered, or even if the animal was slaughtered properly, of a treifa (an animal with a blemish), which will be served at the breakfast in the World to Come, as well as the Behemot which will be halachically not slaughtered properly? Isn’t this contradictory? How can Hashem tell us not to eat from a non-kosher animal, or not to eat non-kosher fats, and then proceed to feed it to us in the World to Come? Especially, as the Yidei Moshe says, as the whole point of kosher slaughter is to instill in us a feeling of mercy by not being cruel to animals. So how can the righteous then eat from Behemot which are inhumanely slaughtered in a “dog fight” with the Leviatan, which the righteous will watch as part of their reward for not watching “dog fights” and the like in this world?
There is a very deep and important lesson to learn from this medrish based on the Yidei Moshe. That is, that Hashem created the mitzvos in order to emulate Him and refine ourselves in this world for preparation for the next world, as the Mesillas Yesharim in fact continues in the beginning of the first chapter: “but the path to the object of our desires is this world, as our Sages of blessed memory have said, ‘This world is like a corridor to the World to Come’ (Pirkei Avos 4:21).” That is, the whole purpose of Hashem creating the Torah, the blueprints of creation of this world, and the guidebook to life in this world. Ultimately however, Hashem created the Torah, and he can do whatever he wants; He is not bound by His Torah. He only said to emulate Him for how He runs existence in this world; but ultimately He knows what is best in the Next World. Therefore, what he forbids us to watch in this world (such as animal fights, which are in fact cruel and inhumane), will be totally permissible and indeed a reward for the righteous to watch and partake in, in the World to Come – under Hashem’s jurisdiction. So too the non-kosher fats or non-kosher slaughtering which is forbidden in this world and is detrimental to our spiritual health will be permitted and given as a reward for the righteous in the Next World; but, again, under Hashem’s jurisdiction – because he knows how to make and serve it in the most perfect of ways.
Torah Riddles Test #22
- Question: Why would you say both the paragraphs for Shabbos and Rosh Chodesh In benching at seuda shlishit if you bentched by night fall of a Shabbos where Rosh Chodesh starts that night but if Purim is on Friday and your Purim seuda runs into Shabbos then you only say the paragraph of Shabbos and not Purim in bentching?
Background:
A. The Mishna Berura in 188:33 says the reason you say both by a Shabbos leading into Rosh Chodesh is because the paragraph for Shabbos is going on the beginning of the meal then we say the paragraph of Rosh Chodesh (or Yom Tov) afterwards which goes on the second half of the meal. However according to that logic you should say both paragraphs when Purim goes into Shabbos?
B. There is a rabbinic concept called Tosefes Shabbos, adding on to the Shabbos before and after.
Answer: On Shabbos going into Rosh Chodesh there is actually additional minutes going into Rosh Chodesh so can say that when bentching it was for one half of the meal and then for the other half because Shabbos could have been pushed off longer to when they were ready to bentch and then it leads into Rosh Chodesh but once nightfall comes Purim is done and over, even if the meal started during the day so when bentching it is only Shabbos therefore only the paragraph of Shabbos is said. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura note 32 in 695:3:15.)
Torah Riddles Test #21
- Question: Why isn’t a Megillah muktzah, according to the Pri Megadim and Elya Rabba, if Shushan Purim falls out on Shabbos just as a lulav and esrog on Shabbos Sukkos or a shofar on Shabbos Rosh HaShana?
Background:
A. The Mishna Berura (688:6:15) explains the reason why they don’t read Megillah on Shabbos of Purim mishulash is because the Rabbis decreed not to lest someone will go to a sage to learn how to read it and will walk four amos in the public domain.
B. The Pri Chodosh argues and says a Megillah is muktzah on the Shabbos of Shushan Purim (mishulash) because since one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of Megillah on that day then he takes his mind away from using it and makes it muktzah in his eyes.
Answer: It is a Sefer, or scroll which people can learn from, so just like any other time of the year one can use it even in Shabbos so to on this Shabbos as well it is not muktzah and could be used if you want to look something up or learn from it. But a shofar is an instrument and a lulav has no use besides for the mitzvah so they are muktzah on Shabbos.
Tzav – The Joy of a Wedding
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Yirmiyahu, in the haftorah for the Torah portion of Tzav, warns of the imminent destruction of the first beis hamikdash and the desolation that will take place in Yerushalayim and its surrounding areas if the Jewish people won’t repent. One of the things he says in the name of Hashem is: “I will suspend from the cities of Yehuda and the streets of Yerushalayim the sounds of joy and the sounds of gladness, the voice of the groom and the voice of the bride; for the land will become ruin” (Yirmiyahu 7:34). The Radak says on this Pasuk that in place of a voice of joy there will be a voice of lamenting, crying and screaming. (Click here for Hebrew text.)
To put into perspective the joy of a wedding and marriage in general, the Yalkut Shimone on this Pasuk quotes a Gemara in Brachos daf 6b: “And Rebbe Chelbo said in the name of Rav Huna, anyone who benefits from the banquet of a bridegroom and does not gladden him violates the five “sounds” as it is stated, ‘The sound of joy and the sound of gladness, the sound of the groom, and the sound of the bride, the sound of people saying, praise Hashem, Master of Legions’ (Yirmiyahu 33:11). And if he does gladden the bridegroom what is his reward? Rabbi Yehoshua Ben Levi said, he merits the Torah which was given with five “sounds” as it is stated, ‘On the third day when it was morning, there were sounds and lightning, and a heavy cloud on the mountain, and the sound of the shofar etc. “The sound of the shofar etc.” And G-d would respond to him with a sound’ (Shemos 19:16,19)… Rebbe Abahu said it is as if he brought a thanksgiving offering as it is stated, ‘they bring thanksgiving offerings to House of Hashem. Rebbe Yochanan (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchok) said, it is as if he built up one of the ruins of Yerushalayim as it says ‘For I will return the captivity of the land as at first, said Hashem’ (Yirmiyahu 33:26).”
The Iyun Yaakov on this Gemara says that the five “sounds” could be referring to the five qualities mentioned in Yevamos of a Jew without a wife who is living without joy, blessing and goodness. And those in Israel add: without Torah and without a wall [to protect from sin]. Representing these five acquisitions acquired upon getting married are the five sounds of joy. Indeed, Rabba bar Ulla added a sixth acquisition of peace, which we can actually say was included in the Torah, as it is written: “Hashem gives power (referring to Torah) to his nation, Hashem will bless his nation with peace” (Last pasuk in Tehillim perek 29).(Click here for Hebrew text.)
But out of all the examples of joy the prophet could have picked to express the direness of the situation, why did he pick a wedding, the joy between a bride and her groom? What about the joy and excitement of Torah learning that was raging all over the city? Or the joy and glee of the Simchas beis hashoava that took place in the courtyard of the Beis Hamikdash every Sukkos which the mishna in the beginning of the fifth chapter of sukkah says: “whoever has not seen a simchas beis hashoeva has not seen [true] happiness in their life!”
It would seem that the most impressionable joyfulness that people relate to is of a wedding between chasson and kallah.
(They just didn’t have Purim yet…just joking;))
Torah Riddles Test #20
- Question: What is the difference between kilayim (grafting or planting to fruits together of different species) and cooking meat and milk together?
Background:
- Tosfos in Yevamos 83a says that if one runs a grape vine over his friends wheat field, since one cannot forbid(ruin halachically) something which is not his then it is not considered kilayim and everything is permitted. The Talmud Yerushalmi holds his own grapes are forbidden but his friend’s wheat are permitted.
- Rav Elchanan Wasserman asks on this Yerushalmi in his Kovetz Haaros (piece 549) from a case of cooking a non-shechted properly animal (neveila) in milk, where the halacha is the milk is not forbidden for since cooking milk and meat does not apply to a neveila (non-kosher animal) because one prohibition can’t be stacked on a another prohibition, so so to the milk is also not forbidden, for since the prohibition of cooking milk and meat come from both sides combined and one side is not prohibited so the other side is also no prohibited.
- If that is the case that should be true by the forbidden mixture f kilayim, if one is not prohibited the other one should not become prohibited as well, question on the Yerushalmi?!
- Milk and meat create a new entity
- Or (a second answer) there is a difference between the concepts of “no prohibition can stack on another prohibition” vs. “a person can’t forbid something which is not his.”
Answer: . (1) Milk and meat when mixed prohibitively become a new entity so they are either both prohibited as a new entity or both permitted because they never really mixed. (2) Rav Elchanan’s answer was that the axiom “a person can’t forbid something which is not his” (ein adam oser davar she’eino shelo) only applies to his friend but that does not mean his own thing can’t be negatively affected. But the axiom “no prohibition can stack on another prohibition” (ein issur chal al issur) dictates that if the second prohibition can’t go into effect because of the first prohibition then it does go into effect at all, even to affect the milk.
Torah Riddles Test #19
- Question: If a person sells an ox to his friend and it is found to be a treifa why is it a faulty sale (mekach ta’us), maybe it will live, who cares if most of them will die, there is a halachic rule that we don’t go by the majority when it comes to monetary cases?
Background:
The answer is not like the Hafla’ah said in Kesubos 15b that once we rely on a majority to answer a prohibition question then we can use that majority to answer a monetary question, meaning because the majority will say whether it is kosher or not it can now poskin whether it is a mekach ta’us (faulty sale). The reason why this answer does not hold up is because many halachic authorities disagree with it.
The halacha of mekach ta’us (faulty sales) is dependent on the will or mindset of a person
Answer: We can assume that a person does not want or agree to buy an animal which is now a treifa since most of the time it will die and only the minority will stay alive.
Vayikra – Being Attuned With Our Soul
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This week we start reading the third book of the Torah, Vayikra. Most of the book discusses the various sacrifices offered on the alter. One of them is the korban chatas, the sin offering, brought for transgressing most types of sins by accident. The fourth perek of Vayikra begins: “And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If a soul sins unintentionally [by committing one] of all the commandments of the Lord, which may not be committed, and he commits one of them” (Vayikra 4:1, 2).
The Medrish Tanchuma wonders why the Torah uses the word “a soul” and not “a person” who sins unintentionally. It writes: “Therefore Hashem says to Moshe, ‘speak to the Children of Israel saying, if a soul unintentionally sins,’ the soul is the sinner. The pasuk says, ‘The place of judgement, there is the wickedness, and the place of righteousness, there is the wicked’ (Koheles 3:16). The soul which was given from righteousness in a place where there is no sin or transgression, and she sins against Hashem? The pasuk is in wonder, ‘if a soul sins unintentionally’?! ‘And the place of righteousness, there is the wicked,’ what is this analogous to? To two people, one is a city dweller and one is a minister of the king, both of them do something illegal against the king. They are taken to court and both were found to be doing same illegal act. What does the king do? He pardons the city dweller and sentences the minister. The other ministers of the king ask him, ‘If they both broke the same law why was the city dweller pardoned and the minister sentenced?’ The King responded, ‘I pardoned the city dweller because he doesn’t know the ways of the monarchy. But the minister is with me every day and knows exactly how I run the monarchy so the one who directly goes against me personally deserves to be punished.’ So to, the body is like the city dweller, ‘And the Lord God formed man of dust from the ground’ (Breishis 4:7), and the soul is the minister of The King from on high, ‘and He breathed into his nostrils the soul of life’ (Breishis 4:7), and both sinned. Why? Because it is impossible for the body to be without a soul. If there is no soul there is no body and if there is no body the soul does not sin. This is why He pardoned the body and sentenced the soul, as it says, ‘The soul that sins, it shall die’ (Yechezkel 18:20). Therefore the pasuk is surprised, if a soul sins unintentionally [by committing one] of all the commandments of the Lord?!” (Medrish Tanchuma, parshas Vayikra paragraph 6.)
The Etz Yosef, referring to the comparison of the soul to a minister of the king, adds that a soul comes from the sanctuary of the King On High and knows the laws of His kingdom which is the Torah that was taught to him or her before him or her came to this world That what the medrish says in the parable that “every day he is with me;” it means that the soul goes up to heaven every night and reports on what the person did that day, and according to the soul’s merits it gets to see what is in heaven and Hashem teaches the soul. Therefore, even if he sins by accident, he is punished as if it was done on purpose, since the accident of a learned man is considered on purpose as the medrish says later on. (Click here for Hebrew text.)
The Etz Yosef says over there that a learned sage who transgresses a sin by accident is punished as if he did it on purpose, because he should have been more careful. That is why the pasuk asks in wonderment: ‘if a soul sins unintentionally;’ how could it be, since it comes from on high and knows all the rules of the Torah, and still it sins?!
The Medrish is saying that the soul is held responsible for sinning and, at least initially (as seen later in the medrish), the body is exonerated because the soul is fully aware of the laws of the King and the severity of consequence if it breaks the law. The Daas Zekeinim has a mirror-image commentary to the Medrish on the above pasuk, but with a different message: that the soul knows how much good Hashem does because he was up there with Him. Either way, the soul is held more responsible for sinning, either because of a greater love for Hashem or out of fear of Hashem and His Torah.
However, in practicality, why should this make sense? The reality is that the body, with all its physical desires and magnetic attachment to this world, is really the force which caused the sin, as alluded to by the medrish itself. The soul is thrown into the body by Hashem against its will and is expected to take control of the body as he or she grows up; why should the soul initially take full responsibility? Not only that, but it seems trapped in this body, not wanting to be a part of this lowly physical world. If the body wouldn’t be there, the soul would not have sinned since it is so pure, a tzelem Elokim [created in the image of G-D]! Why is it the soul’s fault?! Essentially the soul is at the whim of the body, so just as the body is innocent, why not pardon the soul? Furthermore, even if you say like the Etz Yosef that the soul goes up to heaven and has a chance to review with Hashem the Torah each day after he or she already learned it from an angel in its mother’s womb, the reality is that upon awakening on this earth, we are no longer attuned to that; so why be held accountable?
The answer is that we have the ability to be attuned to our soul. By delving into the depths and breadth of Torah and mussar (specifically mussar bihispa’alus, emotionalizing what we intellectually know by bridging the gap between our mind and heart.) we can be attuned to our soul and be careful not to sin. A righteous sage does just that, which is why the medrish says he is culpable for accidents as if they are done on purpose, because he should have been more careful. This also could be why a tinok shenishba, one who is totally ignorant of Torah, is exempt from heavenly punishment for his misdeeds in this world, since he was not in tune with his soul, and wasn’t even given a chance to be in tune with his soul to begin with.
Since the Torah is the guidebook for mankind it is obvious that it is more beneficial to be attuned with our soul as much as possible instead of being ignorant we just have to constantly be sure we are actively trying to strive to take the proper steps and care to avoid making mistakes.
Good Shabbos,
Rabbi Dovid Shmuel Milder