Author: Rabbi Milder

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Torah Riddles Test #39

  1. Question: Why can a Jew make a deal with a non-Jew to take care of his vineyard and eat its grapes in exchange for the non-Jew working on his vineyard and eating those grapes during the 3 years of orlah but if they were partners in one field the non-Jew cannot just work on it the first 3 years and eat from its fruit and then the Jew eat for the next 3 years and eat the same amount of fruit as his non-Jewish partner ate the first 3 years?

Background:

 A. Orlah is the Halacha that for the first 3 years after a Jew plants a tree he cannot eat from its fruits.

B. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 294:13) poskins like the Rambam that by a partnership of a Jew and non-Jew, none of them can eat fruit from the tree for the first 3 years after planting unless a specific condition was made for the non-Jew to eat the fruits for the first 3 years and the Jew for the next 3 years. But the condition cannot be conditional on each one getting the same and equal amount of fruit because that would be trading orlah fruit for regular fruit.

C. In si’if 14 the Shulchan Aruch allows one to ask a non-Jew to work his vineyard and eat the fruits produce during the years of orlah while the Jew works on the non-Jews vineyard during those 3 years and eats the same amount of fruit.

 D. Everyone agrees that one can sell his orlah fruit for money when one first plants his tree (See si’if 15.)

Answer: Trading one’s land for the non-Jew’s land to work the land along with eating his fruits is more like a sale than a trade because he is selling his field in exchange for working and taking care of his field. This is totally permissible, unlike just a trade of fruit for fruit. (See Taz there note 22.)

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Appreciating True Value

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The philosophical debate over how Hashem is the Almighty and All Knowing yet we have free choice in this word has been debated for thousands of years. There is a Yalkut Shimone in this week’s Haftorah for the Torah portion of Behar which brings to focus the obvious but awesome reality that Hashem is in charge, knows and created everything.

The Yalkut Shimone is based on a few pesukim from the Haftorah in Yirmiyahu, perek 32: “Ho! O Lord God, behold, You have made the heaven and the earth by Your great power and Your outstretched arm, and nothing is hidden from You, Who exercises loving- kindness to thousands and requites the iniquity of the fathers in the bosom of the children who follow them, O Great and Mighty God, the Lord of Hosts is His Name. Who is great in counsel and mighty in carrying it out, for Your eyes are open to all the ways of mankind, to give everyone in accordance with his ways and in accordance with the fruit of his deeds” (Yirmiyahu 32:17-19).
The Yalkut Shimone, quoting a Medrish Rabba (Breishis 9:3) in the beginning of Breishis says, “‘Behold, You have made the heaven and the earth by Your great power and Your outstretched arm, and nothing is hidden from You.’ Reish Lakish said in the name of Rebbe Elazar ben Azariah, ‘‘Behold, You have made the heaven and the earth,’ from that time nothing is hidden from You.’ [The Zayis Ra’anan explains that at the time of the creation of heaven and earth, Hashem created all that in the future will be, during the six days of creation.] Rebbe Chagi in the name of Rebbe Yitzchok quoted a pasuk in Divrei Hayamim, “And you, my son Solomon, know the God of your father and worship Him with a whole heart and with an eager soul, for the Lord seeks all hearts, and He understands the thoughts of every creation; if you seek Him, He will be found to you, and if you forsake Him, He will abandon you forever” (Divrei Hayamim alef 28:9). Before a person finishes his thought in his heart Hashem already knows it. Rebbe Yudan in the name of Rebbe Yitzchok said that before Hashem even created his creation he knew their thoughts (see Maharz”u on this step of the medrish.) Rebbe Yudan himself quoted a pasuk in Tehillim, ‘For there is no word on my tongue; behold, O Lord, You know it all’ (Tehillim 139:4). Before one speaks Hashem knows what he is going to say. ‘O Great and Mighty God’ (Yirmiyahu 32:18).” (Click here for Hebrew text.)
The medrish is addressing fundamentals in our belief system. The famous pasuk in Mishlei says “There is nothing new under the sun.” The latest technology, computers, cars, airplanes etc. were all created during the six days of creation. Hashem might not have sent his messengers to reveal it to us until today, when it is the proper time for them to be introduced into the world, but everything that was “invented” or “discovered” has always been around in its potential for 5779 years and a tiny bit, ever since Hashem created the heaven and earth. Not only that, but Hashem knows every word that will come out of your mouth before you say it, every thought you think before you finish thinking it, and in fact he knows every thought and the nature of every human being even before he or she is born. That is how great and awesome and powerful and all-knowing Hashem truly is. If that is the case then the famous question arises of where is our free will?
The fact is the Rambam on a mishna in Pirkei Avos addresses this issue. The Mishna says in the name of Rebbe Akiva, “Everything is foreseen, yet the freedom of choice is given. The world is judged with goodness, and everything depends on the abundance of good deeds” (Pirkei Avos 3:15). (Click here for Hebrew text.)
The Rambam explains that every action a person does or will do is all known to Hashem. But don’t say that since Hashem knows what a person will do then his actions are forced to be righteous or evil based on his preordained destiny because freedom of choice is given into one’s hands to choose between good and evil and nothing forces anyone to do anything at all. And since this is true, the world is therefore judged with goodness, to punish the wicked and to give good reward to the righteous, for the sinner willingly sins and is befitting to be punished and the righteous is willingly righteous and is befitting to accept reward.

It is self-evident that we have free will. We make choices every day, for good or for bad. How then can we understand that Hashem, the Almighty, already created everything from the beginning of time and knows what we are going to say and even think before it actually happens? How are we not preprogramed robots with no sense of worth or growth in our lives? Furthermore, what is the lesson that we can learn from this dichotomy?

Briefly, without much detail, the way I very humbly understand with my significantly finite mind this seemingly contradiction is, granted the song is absolutely true: “Hashem is here, Hashem is there, Hashem is truly everywhere”, but in a whole different dimension out of our time and space which He himself created for us. Meaning Hashem is above and beyond our time and space and therefore he is able to see and know past present and future. He created it and constantly runs it consistently. Hashem specifically created the world and the entire universe, programming it to give humans free choice, a will to do good or bad within their time space so that within “Human time” we are able to make decisions that can affect all of existence. We can discover and invent things which were unknown in “Human time,” accomplishments for the betterment or the deterioration of humanity and the world around us. Yet, Hashem in His dimension, is all knowing, all powerful, above, beyond, and “one step” (really a lot more) ahead of us. He has everything figured out because He created it. Kaviyachol, sort of like a video game which has multiple possibilities and many ways to succeed or get out but the maker knows what’s going to happen at the end of the game because he created it.

Hashem did all this because He is a “Meitiv,” always positive and giving. In His infinite wisdom Hashem understands He can’t just make a world which is robotic and preprogrammed to do whatever it is supposed to do because there is no value to it and it would not be good. Rather Hashem created a system where people are able to earn their way through life or G-D forbid ruin it, in this fashion one can show his or her true value and it can be appreciated which is exactly what the Rambam explains the mishna in Pirkei Avos to be saying: “The world is judged with goodness, and everything depends on the abundance of good deeds.” The Rambam in fact concludes that Hashem hints to us  ways to accrue a lot more reward, “through the more one repeatedly and consistently does acts of good, thus his reward is multiplied, for there is a big difference between handing out a gold coin one hundred times for tzedaka than giving one hundred gold coins all at once for tzedaka.”

Being that we have a mitzvah to emulate Hashem’s ways, there is an important lesson among many that we can learn from this which is that we should appreciate the value and accomplishment of our fellow human beings just as Hashem does of us all, for Hashem went out of His way to create a system in its own dimension of time and space, programming it with the ability to have free choice and creativity in order so that we can choose between good and bad and automatically be recognized for the actions, speech and thoughts we accomplish, though of course Hashem in his dimension knows all that was, is and will be, and even created it, but this appreciation of value and worth must be good. So to, we, ourselves should go out of our way to seek out, appreciate and acknowledge the good of everyone around us and throughout the entire world.

Good Shabbos,
Rabbi Dovid Shmuel Milder

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Sefer Chofetz Chaim Chapter 2 footnote 9 and Halacha 5 with footnote 12 & 13

Footnote 9: Just to be aware of the severity of lashon hara. The starting assumption is that lashon hara or rechilus is ischazik issura, meaning that it is halachically assumed to be forbidden like any other prohibition which can’t just be permitted based a aingke person’s hearsay and that is why the person who lashon hara was repeated to after it was heard in front of three can’t just repeat it again since a single witness isn’t believed on assumed prohibition unless he can prove that he can make it permissible which is virtually impossible by lashon hara especially since meeting all the parameter of the permissibility of apei tlasa is very rare.

Halacha 5: If the 3 people in the group of apei tlasa are G-D fearing people who are careful not to speak lashon hara then The permissibility of api tlasa doesn’t apply because the word won’t spread. This means that the whole permissibility is based on the fact that non-G-D fearing people talk and rumors then spread whether true or not. It so happens that it makes no difference whether all 3 who are listening are G-D fearing or even just one, or if one of them was just a relative or a good friend of the one being talked about then we have to assume the lashon hara wouldn’t spread because there aren’t at least 3 people who might leak it to anyone else.

 Footnote 12 says: The source of this Halacha comes from a Mishna in the first chapter of Sanhedrin that a judge, presumably a G-D fearing individual cannot report to anyone that he found the litigant innocent and the other 2 judges found him guilty. Even if it was 7 judges and 4 said guilty and 3 said innocent so now there are 3 people, apei tlasa, who heard the four judges say guilty still the 3 can’t spread the news of which judges gave the guilty verdict, it appears from the Mishna therefore it must be that apei tlasa doesn’t apply to G-D fearing Jews. He brings many proofs to prove his reading of that Mishna.

Footnote 13: There is one exception to the circumstance where one of the 3 is a relative, friend, or G-D fearing which is a case of a protest when an owner of a property claims to them that so-and-so is poaching on my land land which is ok to believe and spread so that the so called poacher can be sure he keeps the appropriate documents to prove he is allowed on the land. So even a relative, friend , or G-D fearing Jew would spread the word just to help him not to get into trouble.

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Torah Riddles Test #38

  1. Question: Why should a majority be used to decide that a sheep already counted and then remixed into the pen can be ignored or nullified regarding taking tithes of animals but we can’t use a majority to nullify a string of wool which was not twirled for the sake of the mitzvah of tzitzis and got mixed up with other strings that were woven for the sake of the mitzvah?

Background:

A. The Oneg Yom Tov (siman 2) says that if strings twirled not for the sake of the mitzvah of tzitzis are mixed in a pile of strings that were twirled for the mitzvah one cannot use a majority to nullify the invalid ones because nullifying in a majority only works when stuff that are forbidden fall into stuff that are permissible where nullifying the majority removes the issue of prohibition but here the nullifying in majority is being used to make the strands of tzitzis kosher that were twirled not for the sake of the mitzvah and we don’t find anywhere a concept of nullifying like that.

 B. The Gemara in Bava Metzia 6b says that if one of the sheep that was already counted for tithes jumped back into the pen and got mixed up then all of them are exempt from tithing.Tosfos there asks and leaves the question unanswered, why not say that that sheep should be nullified in the majority and all then should be counted in the count of tithing? Problem is that means the majority is actually adding a new din of untithed to the animal that was already counted. It didn’t just nullify that animal because it will be part of the count again which is a question on the Oneg Yom Tov.

C. Chakira in tithing animals: (a) Does the obligation of tithing animals come off by itself once it is counted or (b) really each animal is obligated to be tithed but once they are counted they are exempted from animal tithing.

Answer: If you say like the second side that really each animal is obligated in tithing but is exempted after being counted then Tosfos question makes sense because the nullification through majority takes away the exemption of being counted already and automatically all that is left is the obligation of tithing an animal which by itself it is liable for. Just to clarify, by the tithing of the sheep the obligation of tithing is always on the animal but it is exempted one counted so the majority removes that exemption and the sheep is left with an obligation again which it always has but by the tzitzis, it started off not being made kosherly and the majority would be used to transform it into something kosher which it can’t do.

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Torah Riddles Test #37

  1. Question: Why aren’t we concerned about many sins being transgressed when checking to see if the tzitzis on a Tallis is kosher before donning the tallis but we are concerned about many sins being transgressed when taking care of a sick person in danger on Shabbos, at least according to the Ra”n?

Background:

A. The Shulchan Aruch by the laws of tzitzis (8:9) says that before one makes a blessing upon donning a Tallis he should be sure the tzitzis strings have not torn so that he would not say a wasted blessing. The Mishna Berura there explains that granted there is a possibility of not wearing a kosher pair of tzitzis but one can rely on a chazaka/halachic assumption that nothing has changed since he wore them last. But for the stringent matter of saying Hashem’s name in vain we are extra strict to check that everything is kosher.

B. The Ra”n quoted in the Beis Yosef (Orach Chaim 328) says it is better to transgress the Shabbos prohibition of slaughtering a kosher animal for a dangerously ill person then to feed him non-kosher meat on Shabbos. The reason being is that it is better to do an act of a sin once even if that particular sin is normally more severe i.e. slaughtering on Shabbos, then many acts of sin, i.e. each time he eats a kazayis of non-kosher meat.

 C. The same should be the concern by the Tallis that every moment of wearing a non-kosher tallis is a sin which we should be more concerned about then one blessing that was made for naught. D. A chazaka deals with the present situation not the future.

Answer: When it comes to Shabbos what has to be weighed are the needs of the sick person and the amount of sins potentially transgressed to save him, what is the easiest way to heal him. The Ra”n holds that if feeding him non-kosher is the same as feeding him kosher meat which must be slaughtered on Shabbos then it is better to shecht one time on Shabbos then for him to eat numerous kazaysim of non-kosher meat. But by tzitzis what is really happening is that we are relying on a chazaka and a chazaka only takes care of the issue at present so when looking at each issue presently we’ll say that the chazaka takes care of the mitzvah of tzitzis to be sure it is kosher but we are more stringent by saying G-D’s name in vain so we don’t rely on the chazaka for that matter.

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Emor – The Focus of Life in This World

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The Shulchan Aruch in Choshen Mishpat 26:2 enumerate ways of how and when a Jew is allowed to use non-Jewish courts to settle a case in distinctive circumstances. There is, however, a very important lesson that we must appreciate at the end of this week’s Torah portion of Emor regarding the ideal state the Jews should be able to live.
The Torah states: “And one who injures an animal shall pay for it. And one who strikes a person shall be put to death. One judgement shall be exacted for you, convert and resident alike, for I am the Lord, your God” (Vayikra 24:21, 22).


Rabbeinu Bachye says in pasuk 21 that the reason why “one judgement shall be exacted” was placed next to the previous pasuk is to teach us that the same laws for cross-examining witnesses apply for both capital punishment and monetary cases. He goes on to say that “one judgement shall be exacted” means the judgement of The One, The Holy One Blessed Be He. That judgement, which was given to you at Har Sinai, [shall be used]; they are not like the judgements of the non-Jews and their courts.

Then, on pasuk 22, Rabbeinu Bachye says: “For I am the Lord, your G-D” is only if you do His judgement, ‘I am the Lord, your G-D.’ We can infer from the positive the negative; for anyone that does not act according to His judgements it is as if he excludes himself from His G-dliness, and denies Hashem. This is because it is a known thing that all the beliefs of the nations and their judgements are offshoots of the Torah, while the judgements of the Torah are the main part of the Torah. When we are not engrossed in them, it creates a chillul Hashem, a profanity of Hashem’s Holy Name. Those that can protest, and don’t, also create a chillul Hashem. Those who delegate honor to non-Jews are making a chillul Hashem, disgrace the Torah that was given to us through Moshe Rabbeinu, and they waste Jewish money. The whole world is dependent on laws, and Hashem only gave laws to the Jewish people, as it says: “He relates His word to Yaakov, His statutes and judgements to Israel. He did not do so for any other nation, such judgements, they know them not. Hallelukah” (Tehillim 147:19, 20, the end of the second Hallelukah in Pesukei DiZimra). (Click here for Hebrew text.)
Based on these two pesukim there is a very strong stance against Jews resolving their issues in non-Jewish court. Rabbeinu Bachye lists some reasons why it is a problem; you might cause your fellow Jew a bigger financial loss than he deserves; you are showing more respect to non-Jews than to Jews; you are disgracing Hashem’s Torah. However, the first thing, and what seems to be the most important factor mentioned, is the chillul Hashem of us not being engrossed in Torah. What does that have to do with taking a case to the non-Jewish courts, and why is that the biggest issue and greatest disgrace of Hashem’s name?

We see from here that the ultimate purpose of existence and the greatest sanctifier of Hashem’s Holy Name is the in-depth study and proliferation of Torah. By deferring to the non-Jewish courts, one is causing Jewish judges to lose the opportunity to be engrossed in Hashem’s Torah through deliberating judgement, which is a chillul Hashem!  

By going to Jewish courts and causing the Jewish judges to be engrossed in the nuances of Torah in order to figure out the correct halacha one is making a Kiddush Hashem. What this also means is through just fully observing the mitzvos anyone can make a Kiddush Hashem by being engrossed in Torah learning in order to be sure he is observing them correctly.

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Sefer Chofetz Chaim Chapter 2, Note 7, 8 and Halacha 4

Note 7 defines, ate least according to the Yad Hachazaka, exactly what is “chavra chavrach ees ley:” Only when you have no intentions of spreading the news then if it just comes up in conversation, the nature of the world seems to be that it will be repeated from person to person. The news will just keep on rolling for a long time. However when one wants to intentionally spread some juicy info and he makes announcements and tries publicising to as many people as quickly as possible then the news will get out there but wil not stay out there for a long time and when eventually dissipate, this is considered outright lashon hara and does not fit the category of “chavra chavrach ees lei.” 
Note 8 mentions an argument between the Chofetz Chaim and the Yad Hachazaka on why a person who heard this piece of news with at least two other people can repeat under the proper circumstances quoting who he heard it from. The Yad HaChazaka says you can quote who you heard this info from because the fact he said it in a group of at least 3 intimated that he doesn’t care if he is quoted. (Which means there could be situations where he would care and you can’t quote him.) But the Chofetz Chaim says the reason why he can be quoted is because everyone is going to know by who and what was said any way since it was said b’apei tlasa. However the Chofetz Chaim warns everyone that this shouldn’t be a reason to loosely allow you to speak lashon hara because the chances of all the parameters of apei tlasa being met is very farfetch so one should be very cautios!

Halacha 4 says that even if one of the at 3 people who heard it repeats it, the 3rd party who hears it cannot repeat it, he knows everyone heard about it, because who says it is true and if it can be confirmed that the first person heard it correctly who says he actually heard it with at east two other people. The obvious question we raised was how then does news ever spread? The answer is that there is a concept in Shas that everyone transgresses the laws of lashon hara at some point, at least avak lashon hara (quasy lashon hara which applies by the rules of apei tlasa) therefore because of the unfortunate reality of life whether it is right or not word spreads and repeating it over and over again can potentially become permissible, though as we said earlier it is usually highly unlikely.

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Torah Riddles Test #36

  1. Question: Why doesn’t one’s courtyard automatically acquires eggs in a nest for the one who buys the courtyard in regards to the mitzvah of shooing away the mother bird?

Background:

  1. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 292:2) say in regards to this mitzvah, “Any nest which is supposed to be by you like doves that you are normally raising in one’s house or ducks or chickens that one bought with the house are exempt from this mitzvah . But doves of a dovecote and on top of them are birds that were acquired with earthenware vessels that are built into the walls and birds hang out there, or in pits, as well as ducks and chickens bought with an orchard are liable to be shooed away in order to take the eggs. But this is only as long as the mother bird has not lifted itself from her eggs at all from when they were going to take them. But if she has been raised from the nest and her eggs and the place is his, then his courtyard does acquire them for him and he is exempt from the mitzvah.
  2. The Shach in siif katan 5 says the owner of the courtyard either got the bird to fly high enough that he can’t really get to it as mentioned in si’if 4 or if the bird on her own flew up high enough that she is not touching the nest or chicks with her wings then he is exempt from the mitzvah .
  3. There is a rule that one’s courtyard is like one’s hands, it is an extention of one’s hand, so it can make acquisitions for you like a woman’s courtyard can accept a divorce bill for her from her husband if thrown into her property, just as if it was given to her in her hand.

Answer: The Shach in siif katan 4 says that as long as the bird has not been raised from the nest then his courtyard cannot acquire the eggs for him because since one cannot acquire the eggs by himself as long as the mother bird is on the nest so to ones courtyard cannot acquire them for your since if you can’t your courtyard can’t either. The courtyard is only an extension of your hand.

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Torah Riddles Test #35

  1. Question: Why can’t a woman ideally get married (though if she does she can stay married) if there is one witness who says her husband dies and another witness comes and says he did not die?

Background:

  1. The Gemara in Kesubos 22b concludes in the name of Rebbe Yochanan that if one witness says he is dead and another witness says he is not dead she should not get married but if she does she need not divorce the second guy. The gemara adds that this is based on a ruling by Ulla that whenever the Torah believes one witness he is treated as two witnesses. So the one who says he did not die is one witness verses two witnesses, (for only the one who says he did die is treated as two witnesses leniently.)
  2. Rashi says we treat him as two witnesses to say he died, as we say in the beginning of the tenth chapter of Yevamos, because we are so strict with her in the end, by punishing her very much if she does not cross check that her husband is really dead, as enumerated in the Mishna there, therefore we are lenient on her in the beginning to accept one witness.
  3. The Gemara then asks why she can’t ideally get remarried if one witness has the same status as two. The gemara concludes with a verse in Mishlei (Proverbs 4:24): “Take crooked speech away from yourself, and put devious lips far away from you.”

Answer: She wouldn’t be careful enough to checkout if her husband really is dead before getting remarried, if she would have been permitted to remarry ideally.

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Kedoshim – It All Leads Back to the Same Source

For Food for Thought in Spanish: Haga clic aquí para leer en español. Please share this with your Jewish Spanish speaking family, friends, and associates.

This week’s Food for Thought is dedicate in memory of a 4 year old boy,  Chizkiyahu Nachshon Meir ben Tzvi Ariel, who completed his mission in  life an succumbed to cancer on his birthday, Monday. He was buried in Tzfas by his parents, Reb Tzvi and Temima Eckhardt. Reb Tzvi used to be part of the CITE Chofetz Chaim Alumni Mussar Chabura, may we only share in simchas in the future! 

Now for some food for thought:

The duty of our heart is one of the main themes of this week’s Torah portion of Kedoshim. The portion begins: “Speak to the entire assembly of the Children of Israel and say to them: You shall be holy, for holy am I, Hashem, your G-D” (Vayikra 19:2). A number of pesukim later, while discussing the fundamentals of interpersonal relationships, the Torah writes: “You shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall reprove your fellow and do not bear a sin because of him. You shall not take revenge and you shall not bear a grudge against the members of your people; you shall love your fellow as yourself, I am Hashem” (Vayikra 19:17, 18).
The Ibn Ezra makes a fundamental observation into two of these pesukim. He says that the pasuk of “You shall not hate your brother” is the opposite of “you shall love your fellow as yourself.” He further says that behold, these mitzvos are implanted in one’s heart. By observing them we can stay settled in The Land of Israel, for as we know, it was because of baseless hatred the Second Beis HaMikdash was destroyed. The pasuk continues: “you shall reprove your fellow,” which the Ibn Ezra explains  the reason for reproof, is because maybe you suspect him of some wrongdoing, which didn’t happen. The Ibn Ezra concludes that this is the reason why the pasuk ends by saying: “and do not bear a sin because of him;” because there will be punishment on you for what you thought about him. (Click here for Hebrew text.)

In the next pasuk the Ibn Ezra first points out that the explanations of “don’t take revenge” or “bear a grudge” can be found in Chaza”l (see Rashi on this pasuk.) Then he brings two definitions of “you shall love your fellow as yourself.” Many people say that the letter lamed in the pasuk is extra, like the “lamed” in “L’Avner” (Shmuel Beis 3:30), meaning, ‘love your neighbor as yourself.’ However the Ibn Ezra personally says: “I believe it is as it sounds as it is that one should love the good that comes to his friend just as if it happened to him.” And the reason the pasuk concludes “I am Hashem” is because “I am the one G-D, I created all of you.” (Click here for Hebrew text.)
The Ibn Ezra is explaining to us a major rule in the Torah! The punishment for this sin, as we experienced, is destruction and exile. The positive and negative mitzvos he says are total opposites. If you read the Ibn Ezra’s commentary closely, he seems to be explaining that these two pesukim are explaining each mitzvah from beginning to end. “You shall not hate your brother in your heart,” refers to baseless hatred, which  happens if one is quick to judgement and dislikes a person for doing things, whether to that individual or in general, that are not good. One might feel he wants to take revenge for that wrongdoing or at least bear a grudge against him or her; but what he has a mitzvah to do,and is supposed to do is confront the person and question what happened, because perhaps the suspicion was inaccurate. On the other hand, many people say that the positive mitzvah is to love your fellow as yourself. You wouldn’t want people to suspect you of doing something you didn’t, and you certainly don’t want others to bear a grudge or, worse, take revenge upon you.

These opposite mitzvos make sense, but the Ibn Ezra says he has a different understanding of “Loving your fellow as yourself,” which is to love the good things that come to your fellow as if they were yours, the same way you would appreciate the good that happens to you. Meaning, the Ibn Ezra’s focus of loving your fellow is not on how to treat the person, but how to treat his possessions or good tidings. How does that fit with being the opposite of not hating your brother in your heart, which seems to be clearly talking about how not to treat the individual himself, rather than his possessions or good tidings? Why does the Ibn Ezra call them opposite mitzvos?
The Ibn Ezra seems to be tying the last part of the pasuk with the middle saying, that the means to appreciate the good that others have received is through introspection and the realization that you and him or her both come from the same source. The One Hashem created both of you. It would seem natural that if a person truly realizes and feels this bond and relationship with his fellow Jew, a commonality of sorts that we all come from the same source, then inherently we will care about our fellow Jew and his possessions or good tidings as if they are our very own.

On the other hand, the opposite could also happen. If we don’t imbibe the deep faith that we are all created from the same source, then we can come to view our fellow Jew as someone different, a stranger, and people inherently have a disconnect that leads to hatred for one’s fellow man. Ideally viewing ourselves from the same source will save us from this inner hatred but if the hatred seeps in the Torah gives us a solution to get rid of it by telling us to confront the individual and rebuke him or her. In this way it will resolve any issues or friction against him or her.

In fact we can now appreciate the severity of each mitzvah and why transgressing them can lead to destruction and exile; for observing the mitzvah of loving one’s fellow is living by the belief that we are all created from one G-D, and we have a mitzvah to feel and live that way amongst our fellow Jew. However, G-D forbid we don’t live our lives in that manner, then our feeling is a disconnect which is like we came from more than one source, chas vishalom, the polar opposite.

The Ibn Ezra sums it up nicely in the next pasuk which discusses the prohibition of crossbreeding animals: “And the reason to mention ‘You shall not crossbreed your livestock with different species,’ (Vayikra 19:19) is to warn us that after we are Holy, that we don’t do any corruption toward our fellow man, so to one should not change the way Hashem intended for animals to be made, and this is why that pasuk starts off with, ‘You shall observe My statutes,’ (verse 19).” Everything goes back to the source of Hashem is One with a plan and actions of how He created and expects the world to exist.