Author: Rabbi Milder

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Torah Riddles Test #37

  1. Question: Why aren’t we concerned about many sins being transgressed when checking to see if the tzitzis on a Tallis is kosher before donning the tallis but we are concerned about many sins being transgressed when taking care of a sick person in danger on Shabbos, at least according to the Ra”n?

Background:

A. The Shulchan Aruch by the laws of tzitzis (8:9) says that before one makes a blessing upon donning a Tallis he should be sure the tzitzis strings have not torn so that he would not say a wasted blessing. The Mishna Berura there explains that granted there is a possibility of not wearing a kosher pair of tzitzis but one can rely on a chazaka/halachic assumption that nothing has changed since he wore them last. But for the stringent matter of saying Hashem’s name in vain we are extra strict to check that everything is kosher.

B. The Ra”n quoted in the Beis Yosef (Orach Chaim 328) says it is better to transgress the Shabbos prohibition of slaughtering a kosher animal for a dangerously ill person then to feed him non-kosher meat on Shabbos. The reason being is that it is better to do an act of a sin once even if that particular sin is normally more severe i.e. slaughtering on Shabbos, then many acts of sin, i.e. each time he eats a kazayis of non-kosher meat.

 C. The same should be the concern by the Tallis that every moment of wearing a non-kosher tallis is a sin which we should be more concerned about then one blessing that was made for naught. D. A chazaka deals with the present situation not the future.

Answer: When it comes to Shabbos what has to be weighed are the needs of the sick person and the amount of sins potentially transgressed to save him, what is the easiest way to heal him. The Ra”n holds that if feeding him non-kosher is the same as feeding him kosher meat which must be slaughtered on Shabbos then it is better to shecht one time on Shabbos then for him to eat numerous kazaysim of non-kosher meat. But by tzitzis what is really happening is that we are relying on a chazaka and a chazaka only takes care of the issue at present so when looking at each issue presently we’ll say that the chazaka takes care of the mitzvah of tzitzis to be sure it is kosher but we are more stringent by saying G-D’s name in vain so we don’t rely on the chazaka for that matter.

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Emor – The Focus of Life in This World

For Food for Thought in Spanish: Haga clic aquí para leer en español. Please share this with your Jewish Spanish speaking family, friends, and associates.

The Shulchan Aruch in Choshen Mishpat 26:2 enumerate ways of how and when a Jew is allowed to use non-Jewish courts to settle a case in distinctive circumstances. There is, however, a very important lesson that we must appreciate at the end of this week’s Torah portion of Emor regarding the ideal state the Jews should be able to live.
The Torah states: “And one who injures an animal shall pay for it. And one who strikes a person shall be put to death. One judgement shall be exacted for you, convert and resident alike, for I am the Lord, your God” (Vayikra 24:21, 22).


Rabbeinu Bachye says in pasuk 21 that the reason why “one judgement shall be exacted” was placed next to the previous pasuk is to teach us that the same laws for cross-examining witnesses apply for both capital punishment and monetary cases. He goes on to say that “one judgement shall be exacted” means the judgement of The One, The Holy One Blessed Be He. That judgement, which was given to you at Har Sinai, [shall be used]; they are not like the judgements of the non-Jews and their courts.

Then, on pasuk 22, Rabbeinu Bachye says: “For I am the Lord, your G-D” is only if you do His judgement, ‘I am the Lord, your G-D.’ We can infer from the positive the negative; for anyone that does not act according to His judgements it is as if he excludes himself from His G-dliness, and denies Hashem. This is because it is a known thing that all the beliefs of the nations and their judgements are offshoots of the Torah, while the judgements of the Torah are the main part of the Torah. When we are not engrossed in them, it creates a chillul Hashem, a profanity of Hashem’s Holy Name. Those that can protest, and don’t, also create a chillul Hashem. Those who delegate honor to non-Jews are making a chillul Hashem, disgrace the Torah that was given to us through Moshe Rabbeinu, and they waste Jewish money. The whole world is dependent on laws, and Hashem only gave laws to the Jewish people, as it says: “He relates His word to Yaakov, His statutes and judgements to Israel. He did not do so for any other nation, such judgements, they know them not. Hallelukah” (Tehillim 147:19, 20, the end of the second Hallelukah in Pesukei DiZimra). (Click here for Hebrew text.)
Based on these two pesukim there is a very strong stance against Jews resolving their issues in non-Jewish court. Rabbeinu Bachye lists some reasons why it is a problem; you might cause your fellow Jew a bigger financial loss than he deserves; you are showing more respect to non-Jews than to Jews; you are disgracing Hashem’s Torah. However, the first thing, and what seems to be the most important factor mentioned, is the chillul Hashem of us not being engrossed in Torah. What does that have to do with taking a case to the non-Jewish courts, and why is that the biggest issue and greatest disgrace of Hashem’s name?

We see from here that the ultimate purpose of existence and the greatest sanctifier of Hashem’s Holy Name is the in-depth study and proliferation of Torah. By deferring to the non-Jewish courts, one is causing Jewish judges to lose the opportunity to be engrossed in Hashem’s Torah through deliberating judgement, which is a chillul Hashem!  

By going to Jewish courts and causing the Jewish judges to be engrossed in the nuances of Torah in order to figure out the correct halacha one is making a Kiddush Hashem. What this also means is through just fully observing the mitzvos anyone can make a Kiddush Hashem by being engrossed in Torah learning in order to be sure he is observing them correctly.

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Sefer Chofetz Chaim Chapter 2, Note 7, 8 and Halacha 4

Note 7 defines, ate least according to the Yad Hachazaka, exactly what is “chavra chavrach ees ley:” Only when you have no intentions of spreading the news then if it just comes up in conversation, the nature of the world seems to be that it will be repeated from person to person. The news will just keep on rolling for a long time. However when one wants to intentionally spread some juicy info and he makes announcements and tries publicising to as many people as quickly as possible then the news will get out there but wil not stay out there for a long time and when eventually dissipate, this is considered outright lashon hara and does not fit the category of “chavra chavrach ees lei.” 
Note 8 mentions an argument between the Chofetz Chaim and the Yad Hachazaka on why a person who heard this piece of news with at least two other people can repeat under the proper circumstances quoting who he heard it from. The Yad HaChazaka says you can quote who you heard this info from because the fact he said it in a group of at least 3 intimated that he doesn’t care if he is quoted. (Which means there could be situations where he would care and you can’t quote him.) But the Chofetz Chaim says the reason why he can be quoted is because everyone is going to know by who and what was said any way since it was said b’apei tlasa. However the Chofetz Chaim warns everyone that this shouldn’t be a reason to loosely allow you to speak lashon hara because the chances of all the parameters of apei tlasa being met is very farfetch so one should be very cautios!

Halacha 4 says that even if one of the at 3 people who heard it repeats it, the 3rd party who hears it cannot repeat it, he knows everyone heard about it, because who says it is true and if it can be confirmed that the first person heard it correctly who says he actually heard it with at east two other people. The obvious question we raised was how then does news ever spread? The answer is that there is a concept in Shas that everyone transgresses the laws of lashon hara at some point, at least avak lashon hara (quasy lashon hara which applies by the rules of apei tlasa) therefore because of the unfortunate reality of life whether it is right or not word spreads and repeating it over and over again can potentially become permissible, though as we said earlier it is usually highly unlikely.

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Torah Riddles Test #36

  1. Question: Why doesn’t one’s courtyard automatically acquires eggs in a nest for the one who buys the courtyard in regards to the mitzvah of shooing away the mother bird?

Background:

  1. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 292:2) say in regards to this mitzvah, “Any nest which is supposed to be by you like doves that you are normally raising in one’s house or ducks or chickens that one bought with the house are exempt from this mitzvah . But doves of a dovecote and on top of them are birds that were acquired with earthenware vessels that are built into the walls and birds hang out there, or in pits, as well as ducks and chickens bought with an orchard are liable to be shooed away in order to take the eggs. But this is only as long as the mother bird has not lifted itself from her eggs at all from when they were going to take them. But if she has been raised from the nest and her eggs and the place is his, then his courtyard does acquire them for him and he is exempt from the mitzvah.
  2. The Shach in siif katan 5 says the owner of the courtyard either got the bird to fly high enough that he can’t really get to it as mentioned in si’if 4 or if the bird on her own flew up high enough that she is not touching the nest or chicks with her wings then he is exempt from the mitzvah .
  3. There is a rule that one’s courtyard is like one’s hands, it is an extention of one’s hand, so it can make acquisitions for you like a woman’s courtyard can accept a divorce bill for her from her husband if thrown into her property, just as if it was given to her in her hand.

Answer: The Shach in siif katan 4 says that as long as the bird has not been raised from the nest then his courtyard cannot acquire the eggs for him because since one cannot acquire the eggs by himself as long as the mother bird is on the nest so to ones courtyard cannot acquire them for your since if you can’t your courtyard can’t either. The courtyard is only an extension of your hand.

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Torah Riddles Test #35

  1. Question: Why can’t a woman ideally get married (though if she does she can stay married) if there is one witness who says her husband dies and another witness comes and says he did not die?

Background:

  1. The Gemara in Kesubos 22b concludes in the name of Rebbe Yochanan that if one witness says he is dead and another witness says he is not dead she should not get married but if she does she need not divorce the second guy. The gemara adds that this is based on a ruling by Ulla that whenever the Torah believes one witness he is treated as two witnesses. So the one who says he did not die is one witness verses two witnesses, (for only the one who says he did die is treated as two witnesses leniently.)
  2. Rashi says we treat him as two witnesses to say he died, as we say in the beginning of the tenth chapter of Yevamos, because we are so strict with her in the end, by punishing her very much if she does not cross check that her husband is really dead, as enumerated in the Mishna there, therefore we are lenient on her in the beginning to accept one witness.
  3. The Gemara then asks why she can’t ideally get remarried if one witness has the same status as two. The gemara concludes with a verse in Mishlei (Proverbs 4:24): “Take crooked speech away from yourself, and put devious lips far away from you.”

Answer: She wouldn’t be careful enough to checkout if her husband really is dead before getting remarried, if she would have been permitted to remarry ideally.

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Kedoshim – It All Leads Back to the Same Source

For Food for Thought in Spanish: Haga clic aquí para leer en español. Please share this with your Jewish Spanish speaking family, friends, and associates.

This week’s Food for Thought is dedicate in memory of a 4 year old boy,  Chizkiyahu Nachshon Meir ben Tzvi Ariel, who completed his mission in  life an succumbed to cancer on his birthday, Monday. He was buried in Tzfas by his parents, Reb Tzvi and Temima Eckhardt. Reb Tzvi used to be part of the CITE Chofetz Chaim Alumni Mussar Chabura, may we only share in simchas in the future! 

Now for some food for thought:

The duty of our heart is one of the main themes of this week’s Torah portion of Kedoshim. The portion begins: “Speak to the entire assembly of the Children of Israel and say to them: You shall be holy, for holy am I, Hashem, your G-D” (Vayikra 19:2). A number of pesukim later, while discussing the fundamentals of interpersonal relationships, the Torah writes: “You shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall reprove your fellow and do not bear a sin because of him. You shall not take revenge and you shall not bear a grudge against the members of your people; you shall love your fellow as yourself, I am Hashem” (Vayikra 19:17, 18).
The Ibn Ezra makes a fundamental observation into two of these pesukim. He says that the pasuk of “You shall not hate your brother” is the opposite of “you shall love your fellow as yourself.” He further says that behold, these mitzvos are implanted in one’s heart. By observing them we can stay settled in The Land of Israel, for as we know, it was because of baseless hatred the Second Beis HaMikdash was destroyed. The pasuk continues: “you shall reprove your fellow,” which the Ibn Ezra explains  the reason for reproof, is because maybe you suspect him of some wrongdoing, which didn’t happen. The Ibn Ezra concludes that this is the reason why the pasuk ends by saying: “and do not bear a sin because of him;” because there will be punishment on you for what you thought about him. (Click here for Hebrew text.)

In the next pasuk the Ibn Ezra first points out that the explanations of “don’t take revenge” or “bear a grudge” can be found in Chaza”l (see Rashi on this pasuk.) Then he brings two definitions of “you shall love your fellow as yourself.” Many people say that the letter lamed in the pasuk is extra, like the “lamed” in “L’Avner” (Shmuel Beis 3:30), meaning, ‘love your neighbor as yourself.’ However the Ibn Ezra personally says: “I believe it is as it sounds as it is that one should love the good that comes to his friend just as if it happened to him.” And the reason the pasuk concludes “I am Hashem” is because “I am the one G-D, I created all of you.” (Click here for Hebrew text.)
The Ibn Ezra is explaining to us a major rule in the Torah! The punishment for this sin, as we experienced, is destruction and exile. The positive and negative mitzvos he says are total opposites. If you read the Ibn Ezra’s commentary closely, he seems to be explaining that these two pesukim are explaining each mitzvah from beginning to end. “You shall not hate your brother in your heart,” refers to baseless hatred, which  happens if one is quick to judgement and dislikes a person for doing things, whether to that individual or in general, that are not good. One might feel he wants to take revenge for that wrongdoing or at least bear a grudge against him or her; but what he has a mitzvah to do,and is supposed to do is confront the person and question what happened, because perhaps the suspicion was inaccurate. On the other hand, many people say that the positive mitzvah is to love your fellow as yourself. You wouldn’t want people to suspect you of doing something you didn’t, and you certainly don’t want others to bear a grudge or, worse, take revenge upon you.

These opposite mitzvos make sense, but the Ibn Ezra says he has a different understanding of “Loving your fellow as yourself,” which is to love the good things that come to your fellow as if they were yours, the same way you would appreciate the good that happens to you. Meaning, the Ibn Ezra’s focus of loving your fellow is not on how to treat the person, but how to treat his possessions or good tidings. How does that fit with being the opposite of not hating your brother in your heart, which seems to be clearly talking about how not to treat the individual himself, rather than his possessions or good tidings? Why does the Ibn Ezra call them opposite mitzvos?
The Ibn Ezra seems to be tying the last part of the pasuk with the middle saying, that the means to appreciate the good that others have received is through introspection and the realization that you and him or her both come from the same source. The One Hashem created both of you. It would seem natural that if a person truly realizes and feels this bond and relationship with his fellow Jew, a commonality of sorts that we all come from the same source, then inherently we will care about our fellow Jew and his possessions or good tidings as if they are our very own.

On the other hand, the opposite could also happen. If we don’t imbibe the deep faith that we are all created from the same source, then we can come to view our fellow Jew as someone different, a stranger, and people inherently have a disconnect that leads to hatred for one’s fellow man. Ideally viewing ourselves from the same source will save us from this inner hatred but if the hatred seeps in the Torah gives us a solution to get rid of it by telling us to confront the individual and rebuke him or her. In this way it will resolve any issues or friction against him or her.

In fact we can now appreciate the severity of each mitzvah and why transgressing them can lead to destruction and exile; for observing the mitzvah of loving one’s fellow is living by the belief that we are all created from one G-D, and we have a mitzvah to feel and live that way amongst our fellow Jew. However, G-D forbid we don’t live our lives in that manner, then our feeling is a disconnect which is like we came from more than one source, chas vishalom, the polar opposite.

The Ibn Ezra sums it up nicely in the next pasuk which discusses the prohibition of crossbreeding animals: “And the reason to mention ‘You shall not crossbreed your livestock with different species,’ (Vayikra 19:19) is to warn us that after we are Holy, that we don’t do any corruption toward our fellow man, so to one should not change the way Hashem intended for animals to be made, and this is why that pasuk starts off with, ‘You shall observe My statutes,’ (verse 19).” Everything goes back to the source of Hashem is One with a plan and actions of how He created and expects the world to exist.

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Chapter 2, Halacha 3, footnote at the end of note 4, note 5 and 6

We clarified a few details on Apei Tlasa today. 
1. On a footnote at the end of note 4 we discussed that according to the Rambam, the Chofetz Chaim suggests, that it is only permissible to throw into a conversation the lashon hara you heard with at least two other people only if it is known that the person you are telling already know about it. But if he doesn’t know, even if he will eventually know you can’t be the one to reveal it. Then the question is how do you know if everyone knows. There is no set time given and in fact every place is different. You can’t expect word to travel everywhere within an hour in a big city, for example. The Chofetz Chaim concludes that he is anyways not sure if this idea is true because no one else seems to say it has to be known by everyone before repeating it, just that it will be known. 
2. In note 5 the Chofetz Chaim points out that the lashon hara he’s been talking about isn’t just flat out insults or degradation but anything that might lead to harm whether financially or physically or embarrassment. 
3. In note 6 the Chofetz Chaim dealt with a pressing issue of how the Rashbam seems to permit telling the one who was talked about in front of 3 people what was said about him. Isn’t that flat out rechilus, and can just cause major arguments? The Chofetz Chaim says that granted one cannot purposefully tattle on the person who spoke lashon hara to the one it was spoken about certainly not to divulge who said it, just to start a fight, but since everyone will find out what happens anyways, what was said and who said what then even if it wasn’t within a different conversation, as long as you don’t exaggerate what happened the person who heard the lashon hara among at least three other can repeat it to the one it was spoken about because the Smag who explains the Rashbam throws in that a talebearer is one who reveals secrets not one who says something which everyone knows about already. 

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Torah Riddles Test #34

  1. Question: Why do two sets of witnesses combine to testify about what happened in the middle even if they saw it from opposite side windows and the public domain is in the middle but a group of people on either side of a public domain who can even see each other cannot combine for a zimun of Birkas hamazon?

 Background:

 A. The testimony case is a Mishna in Makkos daf 6b and the question is asked by the Responsa Hilchos Ketanos volume 2 chapter 147 based on a Beis Yosef in Orah Chaim chapter 195 in the name of the R”I.

B. The answer is not like the Aruch Laner who said the case in Makkos is not dealing with a public domain in the middle.

C. What is the “combine” factor that is by testimony but is not there by a zimun?

Answer: By a zimun if the public domain is in between the group they are not considered together and there is nothing to combine them. However by testimony where they in fact come together in court to testify that is considered a form of combining, it is just that in order to be considered one group some of them have to see each other as well when they witness what they are testifying about.

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Torah Riddles Test #33

  1. Question: How can you rely on a posek to poskin if we don’t rely on one witness?

Background:

 A. A single witness is not believed against a chazaka/ halachically presumed assumption to testify about something in reality. An example is a person saying a certain animal or bird is of the permitted species even though it has a chazaka of not being from the permitted species.

 B. The rabbi who is clarifying an issue (not one which is explicitly verifiable in sources) and using his own reasoning to resolve the issue might decide something which is going against the prevailing chazaka. How can he do that?

C. Why would one person deciding something in halacha against a chazaka be any different than one person testifying about the reality of something against the prevalent chazaka?

Answer: The witness is testifying head on directly against the chazaka therefore he isn’t believed against it. But the rabbi is clarifying an issue which might affect other things in Halacha but also affects this very chazaka so since he is not directly going up against the chazaka he is believed to clarify the Halacha which happens to contradict the chazaka. Or you can say that the witness is trying to make up something new which is against what was originally thought but the rabbi is just uncovering something that was unclear before.

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Acharei Mos – Focus

I have many times heard that people wish or feel they should be able to express their love for G-D and worship Him in whatever manner they feel comfortable doing. Where, when, how, and what – on their own terms. Why? Because if they can do it their way, they can show the most optimal dedication, love, and joy that they can possibly feel towards G-D, when they are ready to do it. Why all the restrictions?

An answer to this attitude can be found in the middle of this week’s Torah portion of Acharei Mos, when discussing the prohibition against bringing an offering outside the Mishkan or Beis HaMikdash. The Torah relates: “And Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying: Speak to Aharon and to his sons…Any man of the House of Israel, who slaughters an ox, a lamb, or a goat inside the camp, or who slaughters outside the camp, but does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer up as a sacrifice to Hashem before the Mishkan of Hashem, this [act] shall be counted for that man as blood, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people; in order that the children of Israel should bring their offerings which they slaughter on the open field, and bring them to Hashem, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to the kohen, and slaughter them as peace offerings to Hashem…And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices to the demons after which they stray. This shall be an eternal statute for them, for [all] their generations” (Vayikra 17:1-7).

The Ibn Ezra points out that Aharon and his sons were singled out by this prohibition before everyone else, because at that time the kohanim were for the most part the shochtim, the butcherers, of the Jewish people. The Ibn Ezra also mentions that this mitzvah applies not only in the Mishkan, but for the Beis HaMikdash as well. All sacrifices must be brought to the Beis HaMikdash to be offered to Hashem. The Ibn Ezra also explains in pasuk 5: “in order that the children of Israel should bring” is the reason for this mitzvah, and the explanation of “on the open field” is that it refers to pasuk 7 “And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices.” The demons that pasuk 7 speaks about are called “sheidim” in Hebrew but the pasuk refers to them as “seirim,” the Ibn Ezra says it is because they would cause people who see them to tremble or because crazy people would witness them in the form of goats. Indeed, the reason why the Torah says they shall “no longer” slaughter is because the Jews use to in Egypt which is considered straying from Hashem, and the Ibn Ezra says: “Because anyone who seeks them and believes in them strays from Hashem for he thinks that there is something other than Hashem The Honorable and Awesome who can make good or bad.”

The Avi Ezri, a commentary on the Ibn Ezra, says that in pasuk 5 the Ibn Ezra is explaining “that the main reason for this mitzvah is in order so that they will not sacrifice to demons which they were used to doing in Egypt, therefore all offerings shall be brought to the Beis HaMikdash.” He concludes by saying: “And I already explained that there are many open and hidden reasons for the burnt and peace offering and all who know and understand them can give the correct, praiseworthy reason, as long as your intent is for Hashem on High.” (Click here for Hebrew text.)

A very bizarre thing is happening here. A person wants to bring a sacrifice to Hashem, showing his love and devotion to Him – but he doesn’t want to, or can’t, shlep all the way to Jerusalem to bring it in the Beis HaMikdash. He would rather do it in his backyard or someplace else. What’s wrong with that? And why would that lead to sacrificing to demons which his ancestors did hundreds of years ago in Egypt, before all the miracles of the Exodus and the giving of the Torah?

It would seem that even though this person has complete devotion to Hashem right now, if he were to continue to sacrifice outside the allotted place of the Mishkan or Beis HaMikdash, then he would revert back to his ancestors’ old ways. How is that possible? Because by requiring the sacrificial service to be in the House of G-D, in a central location Hashem is causing us to focus on what we are doing and on Him. Without that focus it is possible for a person’s mind to go astray or mixed up and decide to do something strange like reverting back to his ancestors’ ways of worshiping demons.
So a person could have all the right reasons for serving Hashem, but if he wants to do it his way and not the way Hashem wants it to be done, then he might lose focus and stray from Hashem.

This does not mean that Judaism is rigid and that there is no room for expressing one’s personality and creativity. Everyone is an individual with their own mind, different means, and unique circumstances. For example, the Torah does not say one can only sacrifice  bulls worth one thousand dollars. There is a selection of sacrifices based on one’s means. There is no Jewish law that says one must wear black and white, rather there is a dress code which is based on modesty, looking elegantly conservative. So there is room for creativity as well. There is no one way to make your food on Shabbos or Yom Tov, or what you can eat during the week, rather there are guidelines.

So there is room to express oneself within the framework of Jewish law but it must be done within the framework in order to keep on the Path of Hashem.