Torah Riddles Test #188

1. Question: Why can you remarry a woman you divorced after Nisuin but not a woman you divorced after Kiddushin (Erusin) anytime during the omer? Background:

A. Weddings are forbidden during parts of the omer when we are mourning over the loss of Rebbe Akiva’s students because it creates a tremendous amount of joy.

 B. There are two parts to a halachic marriage, Kiddushin which is the acquisition by giving the ring and the like and nisuin which is the consummation. Now a days we do them all at the same time but they use to be done separately like an engagement and a wedding.

 C. A get (divorce bill) is required in both cases and a Kiddushin and nisuin must be redone both times too.

 Answer: There is no halachic joy when remarrying your wife from Nisuin because you are just getting back together, nothing new. But to consummate a Kiddushin that was broken off is a new step to the marriage so it has a lot more joy. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura 493 footnote 2) 

Sefer Chofetz Chaim chapter 8 halachos 2-4

Who can you not speak lashon hara about:

Halacha 2: You can’t speak lashon hara about men or women even your wife because it says, “Don’t be a tale bearer amongst your nation” your wife and all other wives are still part of “your nation”. There is another proof that you cannot say lashon hara about your wife unless there is a productive reason because there is a prohibition of motzi shem ra, if the newly wed husband claims his wife isn’t a virgin so only deserves 100 and not 200 for the kesuba then if he is right that ok but if he is wrong because he can’t prove it then the Torah finds him for saying lashon hara about his wife. The Chofetz Chaim goes on to say that it was unfortunately prevalent in his day that many people spoke lashon hara about their wives or in laws in front of their brothers and father’s house which he said is absolutely forbidden unless there is some constructive purpose.

Halacha 3: sometimes it is forbidden to talk lashon hara about children. For example if the are orphans and speaking out against them might cause physical or emotional harm, for example there foster parents will kick them out of the house or orphans have more sensitive feelings but if they need to be taught a lesson then you can tell on them so that they will be reprimanded but only if you know they won’t be too severely punished. The Chofetz Chaim does say that even though the example he gives is of an orphan child that is the most prevalent of issues with lashon hara about children but if any physical, monetary, or emotional harm would happen to any child then lashon hara shouldn’t be spoken. What he means is that, for example, if a child was caught coloring on the wall most people will just laugh it off, he’s a child, he doesn’t know better he just has to be taught not to do it, he’ll grow up one day. That is why many times there is not an issue of lashon hara with children. If an adult would do such a thing that would be a crime called graffiti. Of course as was said if harm is done by saying the lashon hara of course it should not be said and now a days we have to be cognizant of the fact that emotional stability is very fragile. My Rosh Yeshiva zt”l, Rav Henoch Leibowitz use to say that back in the early 1900s Americans were like cobwebs now a days we are like tissue paper. Halacha 4: If a person is an on ha’aretz, a simpleton, not learned, he is still Jewish and one cannot speak lashon hara about him but certainly if he is a rabbi or sage it is even worse because one must show more respect to the sage, respect to the learned is respect to the Torah but even worse if lashon hara was spoken about the rabbi then people who ask him questions or go to his shiurim might stop and that will cause them to make up their own observance of Torah and ultimately a new religion because they feel they can’t trust there Rabbi who is learned.

Acharei Mos Kedoshim-Evolution of Atheism


We find a cause for the development of The Haskala, The Enlightenment, along with the Atheist movement, in the second portion of this week’s double parshios of Acharei Mos and Kedoshim. The Torah states, “You shall observe My statutes: You shall not crossbreed your livestock with different species. You shall not sow your field with a mixture of seeds, and a garment which has a mixture of shaatnez shall not come upon you” (Vayikra 19:19).

This pasuk discusses the prohibition of kilayim, forbidden mixtures. Rabbeinu Bachye shares a reason for these prohibitions: “According to the simple understanding the reason for the prohibition of forbidden mixtures is because all the things created in this world whether animal or vegetation has a power source or mazal (fortune) connected on high, and each thing was created in its own species, for this, The Mighty King made a foundation for them in the beginning of creation, so that each one would have their own unique species. So, someone who mixes, or grafts two species together changes and weakens the acts of creation which the Torah writes about them, ‘according to their species’ (Breishis 1:12, 21, 25), and he does the opposite of Hashem who wants to differentiate between each species. It is as if this person makes himself appear that he thinks what The Holy One Blessed Be He has created in this world isn’t enough and he wants to outsmart and add more species, new ones, within what the Eternal One has created. The prohibition of plowing an ox and donkey is for the same reason because it is the custom of farmers after plowing to bring the yoke [with the two animals] into one barn and it would lead into crossbreeding and giving birth to strange breeds resulting in the weakening of creation.” (Click here for Hebrew text.)
Tangelos, a mix of a tangerine and grapefruit, might lead to a juicier fruit, and the mule, which is the crossbreed of a horse and a donkey, results in a stronger animal. Yet while a mule, might have advantages, they are not able to reproduce on their own, and tangelos are a juicier fruit, yet they are self-sterile, hence they really are weakening the essence of creation; and by dabbling in this field one might create more harm than good. However, scientists who experiment in these sorts of things are trying to improve the world and make things more productive and better; so knowing what they are doing they obviously think the positive advantages outweigh the negative. If so, then what’s really the problem?
Furthermore, later in the perek, in pasuk 27 the Torah writes, “You shall not round off the corner of your head, and you shall not destroy the edge of your beard.” Rabbeinu Bachye explains that the reason behind destroying a beard from its roots is prohibited is along the same lines as forbidden mixtures. “According to the simple reasoning the reason for the prohibition is in order not to quash the sign that The Holy One Blessed Be He imprinted in the male gender in order to differentiate him from a female. One who does this (i.e., destroys the beard at its roots) is doing the opposite of Hashem, like one who plants forbidden mixtures, and everything that was made in creation, is written by it ‘according to their species.’” (Click here for Hebrew text.)
What could be wrong with a man destroying his beard? What is wrong with social justice and equality, or gender equality?

We see from here that Hashem had a reason for creating differences in the world and unique species which cannot be combined or blurred. But the real issue is the attitude that one can outsmart Hashem. ‘I can think of an idea, scientifically and morally, that Hashem didn’t come up with, and it will be bigger and better than how things were originally designed. And who cares about the side effects or drawbacks; those are minor and relatively non-existent or important.’

What people don’t realize is that there is nothing new under the sun. Hashem created the ability and potential for all these new species to be created and advancements to occur. He gave us the free will to choose to use our knowledge for the betterment or the destruction of the world, and the moral fabric of society at large. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 56b even says that non-Jews also have the prohibition of forbidden mixtures in the Noahide laws. It is within our power and decision making to use the tools and brains that Hashem bestowed in us to realize the gifts Hashem provides and to use them appropriately.

However, as we have seen with the advent of the industrial revolution and the advancement of technology, it is very easy to think we can “play god” or invent things which were thought to be impossible. Getting caught up in human advancement and not realizing the source for the gift of these abilities which would lead one to believe there is a moral fabric of how to use all the ingredients around them in this world, is what leads one to conclude he is an atheist. He thinks he just outsmarted G-D so G-D must not exist.

For this reason, Hashem created the laws of forbidden mixtures and the prohibition of uprooting the hair follicles of a beard. There are Higher moral standards so don’t mix them up!

Torah Riddles Test #187

2. Question: Why does the Beis HaLevi hold that a person who missed a day of the omer can still say it with a blessing for someone else but someone who is obligated in megilla for Shushan Purim can’t read it for one who needs to hear megilla on regular purim?

 Background:

A. Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank quoting the Beis HaLevi says that even though you can’t say a blessing anymore by the omer because you skipped a day and there is a doubt whether the mitzvah of omer is one big mitzvah or 49 individual mitzvos so when in doubt you must be lenient and not say a blessing but there is still a concept of “arvus” that we are all connected to each other and help each other fulfill a mitzvah properly if we are both obligated in it therefore he can say a blessing for someone else in order that they can recite the omer with a blessing.

B. The Kaf HaChaim argues and says omer is like reading the megilla just as a person who lives in Yerushalayim and is obligated in shushan purim can’t read megilla for one who is obligated in regular purim even though they are both obligated in megilla, so to one who can’t say the blessing on the omer anymore for himself can’t say it for others.

 Answer: By the omer he is really an oness, it is just out of his control that he can’t fulfill the mitzvah if saying the blessing for the omer because of the doubt but he really is obligated possibly but the Yerushalmi has no obligation whatsoever (unless he decides to obligate himself) in the reading for regular Purim. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura 489 footnote 74.)

Torah Riddles Test #186

1. Question: According to Rashi why can’t you teach your child to count the omer in the daytime if it is too late for them to say it by night?

 Background:

A. The Mishna Berura (70:2:9) brings down the view of Rashi that there is no obligation on the father to teach his child to say krish Shema by night even at a chinuch age because he is not found by the father, since it’s too late and the child already went to sleep.

B. This makes sense for nighttime Shema which can only be said by night but the halacha is by the omer if you didn’t say it at night, you should say it without a blessing during the day and it counts so why not do that with your child?

  Answer: Since that wasn’t way the mitzvah was ideally set up, to be done during the day then it is improper chinuch to teach it that way and the only proper way to teach it would be to teach him by night with the blessing which is impractical if he goes to sleep. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura volume 5 in back page 41 footnote 9)

Sefer Chofetz Chaim Chapter 8 Halacha 1

The Chofetz Chaim introduces the 8th chapter with the caveat that anything that sounds simple has to be brought up anyways either because it fits better in the flow or because needs reminders and reiteration so that they won’t make mistakes, in any event their is usually something new that comes out in the end. He begins the chapter with saying that speaking lashon hara applies to both men and women even with relatives and even if you are talking about relatives and they don’t care what you say because we’re all family still it’s lashon hara because you might’ve come to conclusions to quick. This happens to be true about lashon hara on the topic of things done between man and his fellow man, where you can’t come to conclusions you have to question and prove first. But if you saw something wrong being done between man and Hashem then even if you did come to the right conclusion you can’t say it to anyone else because there is no purpose unless you think this is the only way to correct his folly by having someone else go over to him and help him.

The Chofetz Chaim in his Be’er Mayim Chaim explains that this halacha is based on the episodes of Yosef and his brothers as well as Miriam talking to Aharon about Moshe. The Sifri says that when Miriam told Aharon about Moshe separating from his wife the purpose was to go over to him and rebuke him. She even praised Moshe granting that he was a greater prophet than them but is he holier than our forefathers who had prophecy and stayed married. She did this for the sake of the mitzvah of having children, totally pure intentions, yet she was punished. Why was she punished? Because she came to conclusions to quickly. Her attitude should not have been Moshe is wrong and we have to rebuke him rather it should have been something doesn’t look right why don’t we ask him what’s wrong and clarify the issue. A change of perspective and attitude could be the difference of Whether it’s lashon hara or not. Also, even though Moshe Rabbeinu didn’t care one iota what was said because he is so humble, he wasn’t insulted in any way, still it is lashon hara.

Tazria and Metzora – Combat Weapons Against Sin

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The spiritual ailment of tzaraas is the main focus of the double portion of Tazria and Metzora. This punishment is normally associated with the sin of lashon hara, slander. The Medrish Rabba in parshas Metzora shares a deterrent from speaking lashon hara, when it says that there are 5 times the word “Torah” was written in connection with tzaraas to teach us that anyone who speaks lashon hara transgresses the five books of the Torah and therefore Moshe warned the Jews, “This will be the Torah (law) of the metzora.” The Maharz”u quoting the Ba”al Akeida points out that in each of the Five books of the Torah, there are discussed episodes of lashon hara, or the transgression itself of lashon hara. We see from this how impactful the sin of lashon hara is through out the Torah, and the grave ramifications of transgressing such a sin, which is equivalent to transgressing the entire Torah; and who would wish to do such a thing G-D forbid (Vayikra Rabba 16:6).

However, lashon hara is not the only sin which is punished with tzaraas. The Medrish Rabba lists and proves that there are in fact 10 sins punished with tzaraas: (1) Idolatry, (2) incest (3) murder, (4) chilul Hashem, (5) cursing Hashem, (6) stealing from the public, (7) stealing honor from someone which is not yours, (8) haughtiness, (9) lashon hara, and (10) ayin hara, the evil eye, meaning not sharing anything with others (Vayikra Rabba 17:3).
The Medrish Tanchuma in parshas Tazria makes a very interesting observation which results in another two deterrents of sin which not only apply to lashon hara specifically or this list of ten sins in general, but really for any sin. “Another interpretation of ‘A person who has on the skin of his flesh’. Why didn’t it say, ‘Speak to the children of Israel” as it writes by all the other portions, instead it wrote ‘a person’? This refers to what the pasuk says, ‘For You are not a God Who desires wickedness; evil does not abide with You.’ (Tehillim 5:5). Because the pasuk states, [I] say, ‘My counsel shall stand, and all My desire I will do.’ (Yeshayahu 46:10). Whoever hears this pasuk might say, maybe there is a distortion of justice in Heaven. Rebbe Tanchuma said, what does ‘and all My desire I will do’ mean? He does not desire to castigate any creature, as it says ‘For I do not desire the death of him who dies’ (Yechezkel 18:32). This means, You are not a G-D who desires wickedness. (The Etz Yosef explains that since Hashem does not desire wickedness therefore, He did not mention “B’nei Yisrael,” rather “a person” because He did not want to associate them with bad.) What does ‘evil does not abide with You’ mean? Rebbe Yochanan said that King David said to Hashem, ‘Master Of The World if you seek to exonerate your creatures who is stopping You, as it says ‘Inasmuch as the King’s word is the rule, and who will say to Him, “What are You doing?”’ (Koheles 8:4)? Who is greater than You? It is the custom in the world that a governor who sits in judgement and wants to sentence innocence or guilt, he is afraid of those higher than him, that they won’t say anything bad about him, if the litigant doesn’t like the sentence he will go to the local senator who is of higher stature and if he doesn’t like that he will go to the prime minister and from there all the way up to the king, each one has a higher status then the next. The king fears no one, and You, The Master Of The World, if You want to exonerate your creatures who do You fear, ‘evil does not abide with You,’ meaning You don’t fear evil, as it says ‘For I was frightened of the wrath and the fury’ (Devarim 9:19)” (Medrish Tanchuma parshas Tazria, paragraph 7).
Hashem didn’t want to associate the state of tzaraas with the Jewish people because it’s a bad thing and He did not want His children to have any connection to it; therefore the Torah writes “a person who has on the skin of his flesh a blemish etc.” Surely Hashem is not playing a game, and making believe Jews cannot get tzaraas, if they do something wrong surely, they deserve to be punished. The Medrish itself in fact says, Hashem would not distort justice! Also, what was King David saying that Hashem has no fear to exonerate everyone? Again, wouldn’t Hashem the All-Powerful and truthful only do what is right? What then is the message of this medrish?

We must say that of course Hashem would never distort justice, but He is distraught when man sins and would rather see him immediately repent or actually avoid sinning to begin with. We see from here how much Hashem feels bad over the punishment of His creatures especially His close children, the Jewish people. To the point that Hashem did not even want to reference Bnei Yisrael with receiving tzaraas.

Realizing and imbibing into ourselves the “pain” Hashem feels when being forced to punish His children when we make mistakes should be an impetus to avoid doing wrong, coupled with the belief that Hashem has the ability to do whatever He wants and is always doing what is right and best. This, if on our minds constantly should deter us from sinning.

Torah Riddles Test #185

2.    Question: Why can’t Omer be written down to fulfill the mitzvah even according to the view that writing is like speaking?

Background:

A. The Mishna Berura (47:4) brings an argument by Torah learning whether writing is like speaking or thinking the question being whether you have to say the blessing for learning Torah before writing Torah thoughts. On the one hand it’s an action so it’s like speaking on the other hand he didn’t say anything and the blessing is for speaking in learning. The Mishna Berura concludes that one should be strict and not say a blessing in the morning upon writing Torah notes until he is ready to verbalize them.

B. The Aruch Hashulchan says that by Torah learning the purpose of writing is to reveal the thoughts in one’s mind and that is why one opinion says writing is like speaking. Why then would writing the omer be different?

 Answer: The mitzvah by omer, krish Shema, and the amida is speaking it out so writing isn’t enough. So if you did it you would have to say the blessing over again and recite the omer verbally. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura 489 footnote 43.)

Torah Riddles Test #184

1.    Question: What is the difference between making a mistake by the counting of the omer and immediately fixing it and making a mistake by the blessing in shemone esray by yom tov and mixing it up with shabbos and immediately fixing it?

Background:

A. The Mishna Berura (489:32) says that if one said “today is the fourth day of the omer” and then immediately realize it is the fifth for example he just has to say “the fifth day of the omer” and not start from the beginning of the statement. B. The Mishna Berura (487:3) says if a person mistakenly said “mikadesh hashabbos” in his yom tov shemone esray instead of “mikadesh Yisrael vihazmanim” he must go back and say “mikadesh Yisrael vihazmanim” and not just say “Yisrael vihazmanim” immediately, when he realizes his mistake.

C. On a yom tov That falls out on Shabbos we say in our shemone esray “mikadesh hashabbos Yisrael vihazmanim”.

 Answer: On Yom Tov it’s not recognizable that you are fixing the mistake if you just say the correct endings soon as you realize your mistake therefore you have to start from the beginning of the statement. But by the omer it’s obvious that you are fixing your mistake because you never count twice. (See Dirshu Mishna 489:32 footnote 68.)

Shemini – Hard Work and a Thorough Analysis


In this week’s Torah portion of Shemini we find the episode of Nadav and Avihu. By the dedication of the Mishkan they erred while bringing the incense, and Hashem killed them on the spot. “And Aharon’s sons, Nadav and Avihu, each took his pan, put fire in them, and placed incense upon it, and they brought before Hashem foreign fire, which He had not commanded them. And fire went forth from before Hashem and consumed them, and they died before Hashem” (Vayikra 10:1,2).

According to the Sforno their mistake was as follows: “They were under the impression that just as the incense came after the daily offering whereby the Shechina manifested itself, as it says, ‘It shall be a continual burnt offering throughout your generations at the door of the Ohel Moed before Hashem, where I will meet with you’ (Shemos 29:42), so it would be proper to burn additional incense now that the Divine Glory had been revealed to all the people and the fire had descended, therefore they offered it before Hashem on the inner alter, of which the Torah said, ‘You shall offer no strange incense on it’ (Shemos 30:9). Now even if it was the proper thing to do had they but been commanded to do so, nevertheless they sinned by doing it now, since He had not commanded them, as Chazal said, ‘They decided the halacha in the presence of Moshe their teacher’ (Eruvin 63a).”
The Sforno is of the understanding that Nadav and Avihu’s sin was that they decided a halacha on their own, when they could have asked their teacher, Moshe Rabbeinu, what to do. Even though their thought process made a lot of sense, and it therefore seemed obvious to them that this should be their next move, they still should have consulted with their rebbe who, was not too far away, to be sure they did not overlook something. The next pasuk says that Aharon was silent, and the Sforno observes that he was “comforting himself in the thought that Hashem was sanctified through their death.”

However, at the end of the perek we find that, at first glance, it would seem Aharon himself overlooked something. “And Moshe thoroughly investigated concerning the sin offering he-goat, (The Sforno says, ‘that goat was for an everlasting statute, namely, the goat for Rosh Chodesh, a holy sacrifice for future generation.) and behold, it had been burnt! So, he was angry with Eleazar and Ithamar, Aaron’s surviving sons, saying, ‘Why did you not eat the sin offering in the holy place? For it is holy of holies, and He has given it to you to gain forgiveness for the sin of the community, (The Sforno points out, ‘although it was given to you, you had no permission to burn it because it was given to you to eat in order to bear the iniquities of the congregation,) to effect their atonement before the Hashem! Behold, its blood was not brought into the Sanctuary within, so you should have surely eaten it within holy [precincts], as I commanded!’ And Aaron spoke to Moshe, ‘But today, did they offer up their sin offering and their burnt offering before Hashem? But [if tragic events] like these had befallen me, and if I had eaten a sin offering today, would it have pleased Hashem?’ (The Sforno explains, ‘His reasoning was: if the situation were such that they were sacrificing their obligatory sin offering and their freewill burnt offering, even though these sacrifices are not permanent communal holy offerings, and we were to have eaten the sin offering today while in a state of aninus, mourning, would it have been pleasing in the sight of Hashem that in a state of aninus we should also eat a sacrifice which is obligatory upon all generations? It is well known that if a kohen who is an onen eats an offering with knowledge and intent, it cannot atone, as it says regarding kodshim kalim, the lesser holy, ‘I have not eaten thereof in my mourning’ (Devarim 26:14). Although you commanded us to eat the meal offering which is of transitory sanctity, even in a state of mourning, it does not follow that this ruling also applies in the case of permanent sacrifices.) Moshe heard [this], and it pleased him.” (Which the Sforno says means, ‘He rejoiced in the good reasoning of his brother and his sons who understood and taught, [decided the law,] so well) (Vayikra 10:16-20). (Click here for Hebrew text.)
Aharon and his sons were supposed to have eaten their portion of the Rosh Chodesh goat-offering along with the portions of other sacrifices they had brought on the day Nadav and Avihu died, and they were in mourning. Yet they chose to burn the meat of the Rosh Chodesh offering as a mourner would normally do, because they figured that only the special offerings brought specifically for the dedication of the Mishkan were allowed to be eaten in a state of mourning, while the regular offerings that would be continued for generations were not allowed to be eaten in a state of mourning, as halacha normally would dictate.

If Aharon and his sons had just seen the sudden death by Heaven of their sons and brothers for not first consulting with Moshe Rabbeinu, and the Torah even attests that Aharon understood and accepted what happened, why then did they not first consult with Moshe Rabbeinu before wasting and burning the holy meat they were supposed to eat? What is even more perplexing is that Moshe Rabbeinu was happy over Aharon’s response as to why he did what he did; were they not in the same position as Nadav and Avihu? What changed?
If we analyze each situation carefully according to the Sforno we will find that the difference between Nadav and Avihua and Aharon and the rest of his sons was the approach they took to the situation. Nadav and Avihu thought that they had a good idea which made sense, and they had only positive intent. But they did not think it through, to the very last possibility, and therefore they were faulted for acting too quickly when they should have first asked the rabbi if what they were doing was correct. Aharon and the rest of his sons, on the other hand, went through every step of the situation and completely analyzed the issue until they knew that they were making the correct choice, and were able to defend their actions accordingly.

We learn from here no matter how much we think we make sense of something, especially in halacha, we should first consult with higher authorities before acting on impulse, unless we have thoroughly analyzed the matter and know for sure that what we are doing is without a doubt correct. Yet we should be very wary of relying on our own understanding of a situation unless we are absolutely confident and know we aren’t fooling ourselves, which is not so easy to figure out. So better to err on the side of caution.