Category: Torah Riddles

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Torah Riddles Test #21

  1. Question: Why isn’t a Megillah muktzah, according to the Pri Megadim and Elya Rabba, if Shushan Purim falls out on Shabbos just as a lulav and esrog on Shabbos Sukkos or a shofar on Shabbos Rosh HaShana?

Background:

A. The Mishna Berura (688:6:15) explains the reason why they don’t read Megillah on Shabbos of Purim mishulash is because the Rabbis decreed not to lest someone will go to a sage to learn how to read it and will walk four amos in the public domain.

B. The Pri Chodosh argues and says a Megillah is muktzah on the Shabbos of Shushan Purim (mishulash) because since one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of Megillah on that day then he takes his mind away from using it and makes it muktzah in his eyes.

Answer: It is a Sefer, or scroll which people can learn from, so just like any other time of the year one can use it even in Shabbos so to on this Shabbos as well it is not muktzah and could be used if you want to look something up or learn from it. But a shofar is an instrument and a lulav has no use besides for the mitzvah so they are muktzah on Shabbos.

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Torah Riddles Test #20

  1. Question: What is the difference between kilayim (grafting or planting to fruits together of different species) and cooking meat and milk together?

Background:

  1. Tosfos in Yevamos 83a says that if one runs a grape vine over his friends wheat field, since one cannot forbid(ruin halachically) something which is not his then it is not considered kilayim and everything is permitted. The Talmud Yerushalmi holds his own grapes are forbidden but his friend’s wheat are permitted.
  2. Rav Elchanan Wasserman asks on this Yerushalmi in his Kovetz Haaros (piece 549) from a case of cooking a non-shechted properly animal (neveila) in milk, where the halacha is the milk is not forbidden for since cooking milk and meat does not apply to a neveila (non-kosher animal) because one prohibition can’t be stacked on a another prohibition, so so to the milk is also not forbidden, for since the prohibition of cooking milk and meat come from both sides combined and one side is not prohibited so the other side is also no prohibited.
  3. If that is the case that should be true by the forbidden mixture f kilayim, if one is not prohibited the other one should not become prohibited as well, question on the Yerushalmi?!
  4. Milk and meat create a new entity
  5. Or (a second answer) there is a difference between the concepts of “no prohibition can stack on another prohibition” vs. “a person can’t forbid something which is not his.”

Answer: . (1) Milk and meat when mixed prohibitively become a new entity so they are either both prohibited as a new entity or both permitted because they never really mixed. (2) Rav Elchanan’s answer was that the axiom “a person can’t forbid something which is not his” (ein adam oser davar she’eino shelo) only applies to his friend but that does not mean his own thing can’t be negatively affected. But the axiom “no prohibition can stack on another prohibition” (ein issur chal al issur) dictates that if the second prohibition can’t go into effect because of the first prohibition then it does go into effect at all, even to affect the milk.

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Torah Riddles Test #19

  1. Question: If a person sells an ox to his friend and it is found to be a treifa why is it a faulty sale (mekach ta’us), maybe it will live, who cares if most of them will die, there is a halachic rule that we don’t go by the majority when it comes to monetary cases?

Background:

The answer is not like the Hafla’ah said in Kesubos 15b that once we rely on a majority to answer a prohibition question then we can use that majority to answer a monetary question, meaning because the majority will say whether it is kosher or not it can now poskin whether it is a mekach ta’us (faulty sale). The reason why this answer does not hold up is because many halachic authorities disagree with it.

The halacha of mekach ta’us (faulty sales) is dependent on the will or mindset of a person

Answer: We can assume that a person does not want or agree to buy an animal which is now a treifa since most of the time it will die and only the minority will stay alive.

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Torah Riddles Test #18

  1. Question: Why does Rashi say that the oil is the main ingredient of anigron, a liquid type of throat lozenge, only because there is more oil than beet juice but when one eats an olive in order to subdue the harshness of a radish that is enough of a reason to say the blessing is on the radish?

Background:

 A. The Gemara in Brachos 36a says a mixture of oil and beet juice use to be taken to soothe sore throats and the blessing was on the oil (which has a special blessing).

B. Rashi says the reason the blessing is on the oil is because there is a lot more oil than beet juice. Rabbeinu Yonah says the reason why the blessing is on the oil is because that is the main ingredient and the beet juice is only mixed in because it is dangerous to drink oil by itself.

C. Rashi in Brachos 41a says if one eats an olive just to cool down his mouth after he ate a radish he does not need to say a blessing on the olive because the radish was the main food but the olive was just to cool down the sharpness of the radish.

D. Why isn’t Rashi consistent with his rule that if one eats one thing just so that he can eat another then the blessing is only needed on the main food he wants not the food that helps him eat it?

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Answer: This rule only applies when eating two food separately one after the other but if they are mixed together like the beet juice and oil one would think that the beet juice is the main drink if there is little oil and the blessing is on the beet juice, only because there is more oil than beet juice is why we say a blessing on the oil. [/expand]

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Torah Riddles Test #17

  1. Question: Why does the judge only have to write up the claims and final decision but not the proofs and logic behind the decision if a litigant wants to take the case to an appeals court?

Background:

a. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 14:4) says in the Rema: “When they have to write for him the reason why he was judged there is no set time to do it, rather whenever he has a chance he writes it and gives it to him. He does not need to write the reasons or proofs; he only has to write for them the claims and final decision.

Answer: The Sma (26) says that every good court, when they hear the claims, knows how to come out with the proper decision because all Jews have one Torah.

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Torah Riddles Test #16

  1. Question: Why do you need to check on all the mezuzahs of your house and can’t rely on a chazaka after 3 of them are still found to be kosher?


Background:

A. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 291:1) says an individual household should check there mezuzahs twice every 7 years and mezuzahs of the public twice every fifty years.

B. A chazaka is an assumption or pattern that is established after 3 times so if 3 mezuzahs were found to be kosher why can’t one assume that all the rest of his mezuzahs in his house are kosher?

Answer:The Birkay Yosef and Pischei Teshuva (1) both say that you have to check all the mezuzahs put up the same time as the 3 because not all the locations are the same, environment differences, colder, warmer, rain, snow, etc.

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Torah Riddles Test #15

  1. Question: Why isn’t there a difference between lefties and righties when putting up a mezuzah as there is when putting on tefillin?

Background:

A. Lefties put tefillin on their right arm and righties but tefillin on their left arm.

B. Rebbe Akiva Aiger quoting a Mordechai says that even if one’s stronger leg is his left one, that is what he normally comes in with (meaning he starts walking with his left foot, so when walking through a doorway he would assumingly step in starting with his left foot) still the mezuzah should be placed on the right side and it is not like tefillin.

C. Most people in the world are righties.

Answer: Rebbe Akiva Aiger answers in Yoreh Deah 289:2 that mezuzah is protection for everyone in the household not just for the one who puts up the mezuzah.

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Torah Riddles #14

  1. Question: Why do some hold one can make a shehecheyanu on buying new sefarim but not on a new pair of tefillin?

 Background:

a. The Magen Avrohom (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 223:5 brings the opinion of the Birkas Rm”m, but argues on him, who holds you do make a shehecheyanu on new sefarim but not tefillin. The Mahar”I Bei Rav brought in the Be’er Heitiv says you even make a shehecheyanu on buying a Sefer Torah.

b. The Rambam says you make a shehecheyanu on Tzitzis and tefillin just like you make a blessing on doing an mitzvah from time to time like lulav, Chanukah light, shofar etc.

c. The Tur argues and says you say a shehecheyanu on tzitzis because you bought new vessels or clothes. But not on tefillin because mitzvos are not to get personal benefit from.

Answer: The excitement of acquiring sefarim is not just in order to learn them which would fall into the category of mitzvos are not for personal benefit but there is an excitement in enlarging ones collection of sefarim and now having this specific Sefer or set, or a whole Sefer Torah added to his collection, that excitement according to these opinions would obligate a shehecheyanu but most people are only excited to get a pair of tefillin because now they can perform the mitzvah.

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Torah Riddles Test #13

  1. Question: How should it be possible to differentiate between verses in a Torah scroll?

Background:

a. The Rema in Yoreh Deah 274:7 says an idea that the Shach (6) says should be done but not too much, to indicate an end of a verse, since one cannot write periods in a Torah scroll.

Answer: Make a little space between each verse.

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Torah Riddles Test #12

  1. Question: What is the difference between putting a clay vessel in the oven right before Shabbos to finish hardening which Rashi in Shabbos 74b says does not constitute breaking Shabbos under the prohibition of makeh b’patish, i.e. giving the final blow to create an object, since the oven is doing it by itself and you are doing nothing to finish it, whereas the Even Ha’Ozer (Orach Chaim 328) says that putting in wheat kernels to be ground on Shabbos by a mill running on water does constitute breaking shabbos  and is forbidden (according to him on a Torah level and according to the Magen Avraham on a Rabbinic level) even though you aren’t directly grinding, the water is causing the machine to grind for you?

Background:

  1. The issue with the melacha of techina/grinding is the action of grinding.
  2. The issue with the melacha of makeh bipatish/doing the final blow is the result of a finished product.

Answer: You are responsible for causing the machine to grind by putting the kernels into the machine for it to be ground by the water since the issue is the action itself which you caused the machine to do so it is directly related to you since caused the water to start the process. Whereas by the clay vessel you just placed the vessel in the oven and the oven finished the job by itself, so since the issue is not the action the oven did but the results that it created then you aren’t directly responsible for what happened.