Author: Rabbi Milder

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Torah Riddles Test #186

1. Question: According to Rashi why can’t you teach your child to count the omer in the daytime if it is too late for them to say it by night?

 Background:

A. The Mishna Berura (70:2:9) brings down the view of Rashi that there is no obligation on the father to teach his child to say krish Shema by night even at a chinuch age because he is not found by the father, since it’s too late and the child already went to sleep.

B. This makes sense for nighttime Shema which can only be said by night but the halacha is by the omer if you didn’t say it at night, you should say it without a blessing during the day and it counts so why not do that with your child?

  Answer: Since that wasn’t way the mitzvah was ideally set up, to be done during the day then it is improper chinuch to teach it that way and the only proper way to teach it would be to teach him by night with the blessing which is impractical if he goes to sleep. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura volume 5 in back page 41 footnote 9)

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Sefer Chofetz Chaim Chapter 8 Halacha 1

The Chofetz Chaim introduces the 8th chapter with the caveat that anything that sounds simple has to be brought up anyways either because it fits better in the flow or because needs reminders and reiteration so that they won’t make mistakes, in any event their is usually something new that comes out in the end. He begins the chapter with saying that speaking lashon hara applies to both men and women even with relatives and even if you are talking about relatives and they don’t care what you say because we’re all family still it’s lashon hara because you might’ve come to conclusions to quick. This happens to be true about lashon hara on the topic of things done between man and his fellow man, where you can’t come to conclusions you have to question and prove first. But if you saw something wrong being done between man and Hashem then even if you did come to the right conclusion you can’t say it to anyone else because there is no purpose unless you think this is the only way to correct his folly by having someone else go over to him and help him.

The Chofetz Chaim in his Be’er Mayim Chaim explains that this halacha is based on the episodes of Yosef and his brothers as well as Miriam talking to Aharon about Moshe. The Sifri says that when Miriam told Aharon about Moshe separating from his wife the purpose was to go over to him and rebuke him. She even praised Moshe granting that he was a greater prophet than them but is he holier than our forefathers who had prophecy and stayed married. She did this for the sake of the mitzvah of having children, totally pure intentions, yet she was punished. Why was she punished? Because she came to conclusions to quickly. Her attitude should not have been Moshe is wrong and we have to rebuke him rather it should have been something doesn’t look right why don’t we ask him what’s wrong and clarify the issue. A change of perspective and attitude could be the difference of Whether it’s lashon hara or not. Also, even though Moshe Rabbeinu didn’t care one iota what was said because he is so humble, he wasn’t insulted in any way, still it is lashon hara.

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Tazria and Metzora – Combat Weapons Against Sin

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The spiritual ailment of tzaraas is the main focus of the double portion of Tazria and Metzora. This punishment is normally associated with the sin of lashon hara, slander. The Medrish Rabba in parshas Metzora shares a deterrent from speaking lashon hara, when it says that there are 5 times the word “Torah” was written in connection with tzaraas to teach us that anyone who speaks lashon hara transgresses the five books of the Torah and therefore Moshe warned the Jews, “This will be the Torah (law) of the metzora.” The Maharz”u quoting the Ba”al Akeida points out that in each of the Five books of the Torah, there are discussed episodes of lashon hara, or the transgression itself of lashon hara. We see from this how impactful the sin of lashon hara is through out the Torah, and the grave ramifications of transgressing such a sin, which is equivalent to transgressing the entire Torah; and who would wish to do such a thing G-D forbid (Vayikra Rabba 16:6).

However, lashon hara is not the only sin which is punished with tzaraas. The Medrish Rabba lists and proves that there are in fact 10 sins punished with tzaraas: (1) Idolatry, (2) incest (3) murder, (4) chilul Hashem, (5) cursing Hashem, (6) stealing from the public, (7) stealing honor from someone which is not yours, (8) haughtiness, (9) lashon hara, and (10) ayin hara, the evil eye, meaning not sharing anything with others (Vayikra Rabba 17:3).
The Medrish Tanchuma in parshas Tazria makes a very interesting observation which results in another two deterrents of sin which not only apply to lashon hara specifically or this list of ten sins in general, but really for any sin. “Another interpretation of ‘A person who has on the skin of his flesh’. Why didn’t it say, ‘Speak to the children of Israel” as it writes by all the other portions, instead it wrote ‘a person’? This refers to what the pasuk says, ‘For You are not a God Who desires wickedness; evil does not abide with You.’ (Tehillim 5:5). Because the pasuk states, [I] say, ‘My counsel shall stand, and all My desire I will do.’ (Yeshayahu 46:10). Whoever hears this pasuk might say, maybe there is a distortion of justice in Heaven. Rebbe Tanchuma said, what does ‘and all My desire I will do’ mean? He does not desire to castigate any creature, as it says ‘For I do not desire the death of him who dies’ (Yechezkel 18:32). This means, You are not a G-D who desires wickedness. (The Etz Yosef explains that since Hashem does not desire wickedness therefore, He did not mention “B’nei Yisrael,” rather “a person” because He did not want to associate them with bad.) What does ‘evil does not abide with You’ mean? Rebbe Yochanan said that King David said to Hashem, ‘Master Of The World if you seek to exonerate your creatures who is stopping You, as it says ‘Inasmuch as the King’s word is the rule, and who will say to Him, “What are You doing?”’ (Koheles 8:4)? Who is greater than You? It is the custom in the world that a governor who sits in judgement and wants to sentence innocence or guilt, he is afraid of those higher than him, that they won’t say anything bad about him, if the litigant doesn’t like the sentence he will go to the local senator who is of higher stature and if he doesn’t like that he will go to the prime minister and from there all the way up to the king, each one has a higher status then the next. The king fears no one, and You, The Master Of The World, if You want to exonerate your creatures who do You fear, ‘evil does not abide with You,’ meaning You don’t fear evil, as it says ‘For I was frightened of the wrath and the fury’ (Devarim 9:19)” (Medrish Tanchuma parshas Tazria, paragraph 7).
Hashem didn’t want to associate the state of tzaraas with the Jewish people because it’s a bad thing and He did not want His children to have any connection to it; therefore the Torah writes “a person who has on the skin of his flesh a blemish etc.” Surely Hashem is not playing a game, and making believe Jews cannot get tzaraas, if they do something wrong surely, they deserve to be punished. The Medrish itself in fact says, Hashem would not distort justice! Also, what was King David saying that Hashem has no fear to exonerate everyone? Again, wouldn’t Hashem the All-Powerful and truthful only do what is right? What then is the message of this medrish?

We must say that of course Hashem would never distort justice, but He is distraught when man sins and would rather see him immediately repent or actually avoid sinning to begin with. We see from here how much Hashem feels bad over the punishment of His creatures especially His close children, the Jewish people. To the point that Hashem did not even want to reference Bnei Yisrael with receiving tzaraas.

Realizing and imbibing into ourselves the “pain” Hashem feels when being forced to punish His children when we make mistakes should be an impetus to avoid doing wrong, coupled with the belief that Hashem has the ability to do whatever He wants and is always doing what is right and best. This, if on our minds constantly should deter us from sinning.

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Torah Riddles Test #185

2.    Question: Why can’t Omer be written down to fulfill the mitzvah even according to the view that writing is like speaking?

Background:

A. The Mishna Berura (47:4) brings an argument by Torah learning whether writing is like speaking or thinking the question being whether you have to say the blessing for learning Torah before writing Torah thoughts. On the one hand it’s an action so it’s like speaking on the other hand he didn’t say anything and the blessing is for speaking in learning. The Mishna Berura concludes that one should be strict and not say a blessing in the morning upon writing Torah notes until he is ready to verbalize them.

B. The Aruch Hashulchan says that by Torah learning the purpose of writing is to reveal the thoughts in one’s mind and that is why one opinion says writing is like speaking. Why then would writing the omer be different?

 Answer: The mitzvah by omer, krish Shema, and the amida is speaking it out so writing isn’t enough. So if you did it you would have to say the blessing over again and recite the omer verbally. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura 489 footnote 43.)

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Torah Riddles Test #184

1.    Question: What is the difference between making a mistake by the counting of the omer and immediately fixing it and making a mistake by the blessing in shemone esray by yom tov and mixing it up with shabbos and immediately fixing it?

Background:

A. The Mishna Berura (489:32) says that if one said “today is the fourth day of the omer” and then immediately realize it is the fifth for example he just has to say “the fifth day of the omer” and not start from the beginning of the statement. B. The Mishna Berura (487:3) says if a person mistakenly said “mikadesh hashabbos” in his yom tov shemone esray instead of “mikadesh Yisrael vihazmanim” he must go back and say “mikadesh Yisrael vihazmanim” and not just say “Yisrael vihazmanim” immediately, when he realizes his mistake.

C. On a yom tov That falls out on Shabbos we say in our shemone esray “mikadesh hashabbos Yisrael vihazmanim”.

 Answer: On Yom Tov it’s not recognizable that you are fixing the mistake if you just say the correct endings soon as you realize your mistake therefore you have to start from the beginning of the statement. But by the omer it’s obvious that you are fixing your mistake because you never count twice. (See Dirshu Mishna 489:32 footnote 68.)

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Shemini – Hard Work and a Thorough Analysis


In this week’s Torah portion of Shemini we find the episode of Nadav and Avihu. By the dedication of the Mishkan they erred while bringing the incense, and Hashem killed them on the spot. “And Aharon’s sons, Nadav and Avihu, each took his pan, put fire in them, and placed incense upon it, and they brought before Hashem foreign fire, which He had not commanded them. And fire went forth from before Hashem and consumed them, and they died before Hashem” (Vayikra 10:1,2).

According to the Sforno their mistake was as follows: “They were under the impression that just as the incense came after the daily offering whereby the Shechina manifested itself, as it says, ‘It shall be a continual burnt offering throughout your generations at the door of the Ohel Moed before Hashem, where I will meet with you’ (Shemos 29:42), so it would be proper to burn additional incense now that the Divine Glory had been revealed to all the people and the fire had descended, therefore they offered it before Hashem on the inner alter, of which the Torah said, ‘You shall offer no strange incense on it’ (Shemos 30:9). Now even if it was the proper thing to do had they but been commanded to do so, nevertheless they sinned by doing it now, since He had not commanded them, as Chazal said, ‘They decided the halacha in the presence of Moshe their teacher’ (Eruvin 63a).”
The Sforno is of the understanding that Nadav and Avihu’s sin was that they decided a halacha on their own, when they could have asked their teacher, Moshe Rabbeinu, what to do. Even though their thought process made a lot of sense, and it therefore seemed obvious to them that this should be their next move, they still should have consulted with their rebbe who, was not too far away, to be sure they did not overlook something. The next pasuk says that Aharon was silent, and the Sforno observes that he was “comforting himself in the thought that Hashem was sanctified through their death.”

However, at the end of the perek we find that, at first glance, it would seem Aharon himself overlooked something. “And Moshe thoroughly investigated concerning the sin offering he-goat, (The Sforno says, ‘that goat was for an everlasting statute, namely, the goat for Rosh Chodesh, a holy sacrifice for future generation.) and behold, it had been burnt! So, he was angry with Eleazar and Ithamar, Aaron’s surviving sons, saying, ‘Why did you not eat the sin offering in the holy place? For it is holy of holies, and He has given it to you to gain forgiveness for the sin of the community, (The Sforno points out, ‘although it was given to you, you had no permission to burn it because it was given to you to eat in order to bear the iniquities of the congregation,) to effect their atonement before the Hashem! Behold, its blood was not brought into the Sanctuary within, so you should have surely eaten it within holy [precincts], as I commanded!’ And Aaron spoke to Moshe, ‘But today, did they offer up their sin offering and their burnt offering before Hashem? But [if tragic events] like these had befallen me, and if I had eaten a sin offering today, would it have pleased Hashem?’ (The Sforno explains, ‘His reasoning was: if the situation were such that they were sacrificing their obligatory sin offering and their freewill burnt offering, even though these sacrifices are not permanent communal holy offerings, and we were to have eaten the sin offering today while in a state of aninus, mourning, would it have been pleasing in the sight of Hashem that in a state of aninus we should also eat a sacrifice which is obligatory upon all generations? It is well known that if a kohen who is an onen eats an offering with knowledge and intent, it cannot atone, as it says regarding kodshim kalim, the lesser holy, ‘I have not eaten thereof in my mourning’ (Devarim 26:14). Although you commanded us to eat the meal offering which is of transitory sanctity, even in a state of mourning, it does not follow that this ruling also applies in the case of permanent sacrifices.) Moshe heard [this], and it pleased him.” (Which the Sforno says means, ‘He rejoiced in the good reasoning of his brother and his sons who understood and taught, [decided the law,] so well) (Vayikra 10:16-20). (Click here for Hebrew text.)
Aharon and his sons were supposed to have eaten their portion of the Rosh Chodesh goat-offering along with the portions of other sacrifices they had brought on the day Nadav and Avihu died, and they were in mourning. Yet they chose to burn the meat of the Rosh Chodesh offering as a mourner would normally do, because they figured that only the special offerings brought specifically for the dedication of the Mishkan were allowed to be eaten in a state of mourning, while the regular offerings that would be continued for generations were not allowed to be eaten in a state of mourning, as halacha normally would dictate.

If Aharon and his sons had just seen the sudden death by Heaven of their sons and brothers for not first consulting with Moshe Rabbeinu, and the Torah even attests that Aharon understood and accepted what happened, why then did they not first consult with Moshe Rabbeinu before wasting and burning the holy meat they were supposed to eat? What is even more perplexing is that Moshe Rabbeinu was happy over Aharon’s response as to why he did what he did; were they not in the same position as Nadav and Avihu? What changed?
If we analyze each situation carefully according to the Sforno we will find that the difference between Nadav and Avihua and Aharon and the rest of his sons was the approach they took to the situation. Nadav and Avihu thought that they had a good idea which made sense, and they had only positive intent. But they did not think it through, to the very last possibility, and therefore they were faulted for acting too quickly when they should have first asked the rabbi if what they were doing was correct. Aharon and the rest of his sons, on the other hand, went through every step of the situation and completely analyzed the issue until they knew that they were making the correct choice, and were able to defend their actions accordingly.

We learn from here no matter how much we think we make sense of something, especially in halacha, we should first consult with higher authorities before acting on impulse, unless we have thoroughly analyzed the matter and know for sure that what we are doing is without a doubt correct. Yet we should be very wary of relying on our own understanding of a situation unless we are absolutely confident and know we aren’t fooling ourselves, which is not so easy to figure out. So better to err on the side of caution.

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Tzav – For the Honor of the Children

This Dvar Torah is dedicated in memory of my Rosh HaYeshiva, Moreinu viRabbeinu HaRav Alter Chanoch Henoch ben Chaim Dovid Leibowitz ztzk”l, Rosh Yeshivas Chofetz Chaim, upon his yahretzeit which was Yud Nissan.

Only because of Moshe Rabbeinu’s prayer was Hashem willing to send a message to Aharon in the beginning of this week’s Torah portion of Tzav. If not for this prayer, Hashem would not want anything to do with Aharon Kohen Gadol after his involvement with the sin of the Golden Calf.
In fact, the Rosh summarizing a Medrish Rabba (Vayikra 7:1) in the beginning of this week’s parsha of Tzav which asks, “’Why wasn’t the name of Aharon mentioned in the Torah portion of Vayikra? It was because he was reprimanded for the action of the golden calf, only his sons [were mentioned, ‘Bnei Aharon’ or ‘hakohen.’ And the two times (2:3&10) in last week’s parsha that it says Aharon and his sons was only because the Torah had to differentiate between the kohen gadol and the other kohanim so Hashem felt it was not worth using extra ink just to punish Aharon.] Moshe said before Hashem, ‘Master Of The World is a pit ever hated and it’s water pleasant? Didn’t you have mercy on the olive and warned not to cut olive wood for the sake of the oil which is needed for light and meal offerings? So to, the children of Aharon are beloved before you and you don’t have mercy on the honor of their father?’ Only then did The Master acquiesce to the student and said, ‘Command Aharon’ (Vayikra 6:2).’ One can ask, what does hatred towards the father have to do with loving the sons? This can be answered with a parable to a king who had servants and two lads were guardsmen who were handsome and very strong who always walked with him. Their father was a villager. The king said it is better to make the father a knight in order to call the children sons of knights, even though the father was appalling in the king’s eyes. So too, the children of Aharon were beloved by Hashem and in their honor He called to their father and commanded him what He commanded.” (Click here and here for Hebrew text.)
We must put into perspective Aharon’s involvement in the sin of the golden calf. He by no means had any intent of creating an idol or in fact doubted that his brother Moshe would come back. Indeed, he only advised the ringleaders of the rebellion to make the golden calf in order to buy time for Moshe to come back, because they had miscalculated Moshe’s return. Aharon told them to collect gold jewelry from their wives, who he knew would refuse, but he did not realize the men would force it off them. This was after his uncle, Chur, was already killed by the mob trying to calm them down. So, whatever got Hashem upset and therefore decided to not address Aharon in the Torah portion of Vayikra, and only do so after Moshe beseeched Him to do so for his children’s sake, it must have been because of some very slight misjudgment that lead to the whole debacle. Aharon is known to have been one who ran after peace, a rodef shalom; but Hashem judges his righteous strictly, according to their level. This is analogous to a concept the Ramban mentions in the beginning of his sefer about reward and punishment, Sha’ar HaGemul, where he talks about the famous Chaza”l of when Hashem judges the world on Rosh Hashana, those who are righteous go straight to life, those who are wicked go straight to death and those in the middle are held in limbo until Yom Kippur. The Ramban mentions that included in ‘the wicked’ are “those of good deeds who transgress only one sin but are sentenced on Rosh Hashana to death, meaning they will die this coming year or live through some challenging illnesses, a life of suffering and tribulation, which just means he was sentenced to a judgement of a totally wicked person even though he is in fact righteous and deserving of life in the World to Come.” We see that a person can be viewed in “the eyes of Hashem” as being wicked at this moment, even though he is in fact very righteous. For this reason Aharon fell out of favor with Hashem after his involvement with the sin of the golden calf.

But what did it help to ask Hashem to elevate Aharon’s status for the sake of his children, out of respect for them, which really is for Hashem’s honor as well? Isn’t it a game, doesn’t it sound like a lack of truth to promote someone who doesn’t deserve a promotion on his own merits?

However, of course that can’t be true. Hashem is absolutely honest and by definition He is perfectly truthful. Rather it must be that granted on his own personal merits Aharon did not deserve to be addressed at that time, which when thinking about it is a great travesty for him because the Book of Vayikra, the service of the Kohanim in the Mishkan is Aharon’s whole essence. It’s his most important role in life and now Hashem refuses to talk to him about it, only to his children?! However, the very fact that he has children so beloved to Hashem is a merit for his promotion and that is duly justified.

Coincidentally (or not so coincidentally…) this week’s haftorah for Shabbos Hagadol concludes, “that he may turn the heart of the fathers back through the children, and the heart of the children back through their fathers” (Malachi 3:24).

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Sefer Chofetz Chaim chapter 7, halachos 13, 14

We finished the 7th chapter of Chofetz Chaim laws if lashon hara today. There are times when a court is allowed to take action into their own hands and beat someone to admit to a crime but that is only when it is clear to the victim and the court that this is the would be burglar, for example if the victim runs into court and tells the judges he has circumstantial evidence that so and so stole from him and the court sees the evidence and it makes sense or there are witnesses that the evidence seem to be true then the court can take action in order for the thief to admit guilt. The case we had last week of Mar Zutra hitting his household member in order to admit wrongdoing because he was accused of stealing a silver goblet from a guest because he was caught drying his hands on someone’s clothes was a very special circumstance where he knew it could only have been someone in his household who was the perpetrator and everyone else were not suspicious and had an assumed presumption of honest therefore even though the fact the guy wiped his hand on someone’s shirt is only slight evidence but now that this narrowed down the possibilities it was strong enough evidence to act upon. But in general, to just rely on a claim that a victim has and his suspicions is not allowed because the perpetrator could be anyone in the city so you need clear evidence to act. It is inappropriate for an individual or even the city council or police to act solely on the claim and suspicions of a victim. Concrete evidence must be submitted to the courts and they can take action if needed to force admission to a crime.

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Vayikra – Sacrificial Offerings and Pesach: No Double Standards

This dvar Torah is dedicated in memory of my paternal grandparents, Menachem Mendel ben Chaim and Raizel ben Moshe upon their yahretzeit, the 5th of Nissan. They passed away on the same day a few years apart. 

This week we begin the Book of Vayikra which mainly discusses the sacrificial offerings first brought in the Mishkan and eventually in the Beis HaMikdash.
Rabbeinu Bachye says the simple reason of why offerings were brought to Hashem was, “The offerings were all for the sake of mankind. For The Exulted Hashem desired that man shall be the chosen species and for him the world was created in order to be totally spiritual like the angels of Hashem, without sin. But when man sinned, he was guilty because of his evil inclination (yetzer hara) embedded inside him. It is therefore befitting for him to regret, recognize, and focus on the meek state of himself and the glorified quality of his Exulted Master who he rebelled against His word. And he is obligated to place in his heart that he sinned before Him with his body and soul. Since all the actions of man can be included in 3 categories, action, speech, and thought, which are 3 ways to sin, therefore the Torah obligated man to bring a sacrifice for his sin…” (See Rabbeinu Bachye in his entirety in Vayikra 1:9).

One of the forms of sacrifice for atonement of sin was a meal offering. There is an important lesson here which relates to Pesach. The Torah states, “Any meal offering that you will bring to Hashem should not be made with chometz, for any leaven and any honey should not be burned on the fire to Hashem” (Vayikra 2:13). Rabbeinu Bachye explains that the simple reason why no chometz or honey was part of the meal offering was because, “sacrifices were an atonement for our sins, and if not for the inciter, and enticer who is the yetzer hara, man would not sin and would not need to bring a sacrifice at all. Leaven and honey are the yetzer hara itself as Chaza”l say regarding chometz and matzah on Pesach that a person must turn his heart from the yetzer hara. That is why the Torah says, ‘Don’t eat upon it chometz’ (Devarim 16:3), referring to the korban Pesach. And the Korban Pesach was an atonement for the idols they worshipped in Egypt. For this reason, He distanced them from the yetzer hara in order to not go back to idolatry…” (Click here for Hebrew text.)
Rabbeinu Bachye concludes his simple understanding of why there aren’t chometz and honey in meal offerings saying, “and therefore [Hashem] distanced leaven and honey from the offering for it doesn’t make sense to have a dichotomy in one subject, furthermore it would appear as if one is trying to purify himself with a creepy crawler in his hand, this is self-understood.”
It would seem, and it seems logical, that the meal offering should ideally have been made with chometz in order for it to be a more respectable offering. We even find two pesukim later that Rabbeinu Bachye explains the simple reason of why offerings were salted “because it would be unbefitting for a sacrifice to Hashem to be bland, without salt. The Torah is teaching us proper manners that the Kingdom in Heaven is like the kingdom on earth, and in this manner, ‘Were you to offer it to your governor’ (Malachi 1:8)?” In fact, the korban todah, the thanksgiving offering, which is an offering giving thanks and not given as atonement for sin, was indeed made out of chometz. Ideally, an offering fit for The King should be given in the nicest and choicest way possible. It is only because the yetzer hara is associated with chometz and honey that the Torah did not want any association with it for an offering used as an atonement. Rabbeinu Bachye illustrated this point with the example of the korban pesach, which was brought as an atonement for idolatry in Egypt. In fact, the Jews worshipped the lamb along with the Egyptians, so Hashem said to slaughter the lamb and eat it as a means of belittling and defaming the Egyptian god, and only matzah can be eaten with it, in order to not have even a tiny hint, not even one iota of an association with, the yetzer hara, in order to have no association whatsoever with the enticement of sin.

Why then does the Rabbeinu Bachye add that the reason for not having leaven and honey is in order to not have a dichotomy in one’s offering or to not be holding onto an impure object while trying to purify himself? It seems that that is the reason why these ingredients aren’t allowed, and not because in order to leave the sinful path that one was on by going to the extreme to distance himself from any spec of sin or evil inclination?

It would seem that the main issue of having chometz with one’s offering for atonement is not the association with sin and the evil inclination but rather the self-contradiction created in such a sacrifice. Whether it sends a message of a dichotomy or actually in a sense is a real physical contradiction, in any event, to harbor such a state even though it might look more respectful and honorable for The King, it is not the way Hashem wants us to live our lives.

The Paschal Lamb and matzah as well as every other sacrificial atonement made without chometz sends a message that we must live a life of harmony and consistency.

Click here for Audio or here for video of another Pre-Pesach message.

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Torah Riddles Test #183

2. Question: Why does the Eliah Rabba (447:1) differentiate between a hot piece of food (for example meat) which a kernel of wheat fell on it and a hot and wet ladle which had a kernel of wheat fall on it in terms of them being able to transfer the taste of that wheat kernel into a cooked dish?

Background:

A. By the meat he says the taste of the kernel cannot be transferred into anything else by the ladle he says the taste of the kernel can be transferred.

B. When a wheat kernel, supposedly chometz, falls onto the food or ladle on Pesach it must be removed and destroyed but now there is a very little amount of taste that is transferred into the meat or wet ladle if they are hot. However in terms of the meat we apply the axiom of “trei mashehu lo amrinan” meaning two insignificant amounts we are not bothered by, which means that the taste of chometz is so little we aren’t concerned that it got transferred to the next item that the meat was put into. But we are concerned about the transference of taste of chometz into the food that the ladle now mixes, why?

 Answer: When taste is mixed into food it sticks to the wall of the food and gets mixed up in it so never comes back out but by a spoon since whatever taste is inside it is not the spoon’s it comes from the outside it doesn’t get stuck to the spoon and easily comes out when mixed into the next thing it is used for. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura 467:footnote 41.)