Author: Rabbi Milder

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Torah Riddles Test #36

  1. Question: Why doesn’t one’s courtyard automatically acquires eggs in a nest for the one who buys the courtyard in regards to the mitzvah of shooing away the mother bird?

Background:

  1. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 292:2) say in regards to this mitzvah, “Any nest which is supposed to be by you like doves that you are normally raising in one’s house or ducks or chickens that one bought with the house are exempt from this mitzvah . But doves of a dovecote and on top of them are birds that were acquired with earthenware vessels that are built into the walls and birds hang out there, or in pits, as well as ducks and chickens bought with an orchard are liable to be shooed away in order to take the eggs. But this is only as long as the mother bird has not lifted itself from her eggs at all from when they were going to take them. But if she has been raised from the nest and her eggs and the place is his, then his courtyard does acquire them for him and he is exempt from the mitzvah.
  2. The Shach in siif katan 5 says the owner of the courtyard either got the bird to fly high enough that he can’t really get to it as mentioned in si’if 4 or if the bird on her own flew up high enough that she is not touching the nest or chicks with her wings then he is exempt from the mitzvah .
  3. There is a rule that one’s courtyard is like one’s hands, it is an extention of one’s hand, so it can make acquisitions for you like a woman’s courtyard can accept a divorce bill for her from her husband if thrown into her property, just as if it was given to her in her hand.

Answer: The Shach in siif katan 4 says that as long as the bird has not been raised from the nest then his courtyard cannot acquire the eggs for him because since one cannot acquire the eggs by himself as long as the mother bird is on the nest so to ones courtyard cannot acquire them for your since if you can’t your courtyard can’t either. The courtyard is only an extension of your hand.

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Torah Riddles Test #35

  1. Question: Why can’t a woman ideally get married (though if she does she can stay married) if there is one witness who says her husband dies and another witness comes and says he did not die?

Background:

  1. The Gemara in Kesubos 22b concludes in the name of Rebbe Yochanan that if one witness says he is dead and another witness says he is not dead she should not get married but if she does she need not divorce the second guy. The gemara adds that this is based on a ruling by Ulla that whenever the Torah believes one witness he is treated as two witnesses. So the one who says he did not die is one witness verses two witnesses, (for only the one who says he did die is treated as two witnesses leniently.)
  2. Rashi says we treat him as two witnesses to say he died, as we say in the beginning of the tenth chapter of Yevamos, because we are so strict with her in the end, by punishing her very much if she does not cross check that her husband is really dead, as enumerated in the Mishna there, therefore we are lenient on her in the beginning to accept one witness.
  3. The Gemara then asks why she can’t ideally get remarried if one witness has the same status as two. The gemara concludes with a verse in Mishlei (Proverbs 4:24): “Take crooked speech away from yourself, and put devious lips far away from you.”

Answer: She wouldn’t be careful enough to checkout if her husband really is dead before getting remarried, if she would have been permitted to remarry ideally.

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Kedoshim – It All Leads Back to the Same Source

For Food for Thought in Spanish: Haga clic aquí para leer en español. Please share this with your Jewish Spanish speaking family, friends, and associates.

This week’s Food for Thought is dedicate in memory of a 4 year old boy,  Chizkiyahu Nachshon Meir ben Tzvi Ariel, who completed his mission in  life an succumbed to cancer on his birthday, Monday. He was buried in Tzfas by his parents, Reb Tzvi and Temima Eckhardt. Reb Tzvi used to be part of the CITE Chofetz Chaim Alumni Mussar Chabura, may we only share in simchas in the future! 

Now for some food for thought:

The duty of our heart is one of the main themes of this week’s Torah portion of Kedoshim. The portion begins: “Speak to the entire assembly of the Children of Israel and say to them: You shall be holy, for holy am I, Hashem, your G-D” (Vayikra 19:2). A number of pesukim later, while discussing the fundamentals of interpersonal relationships, the Torah writes: “You shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall reprove your fellow and do not bear a sin because of him. You shall not take revenge and you shall not bear a grudge against the members of your people; you shall love your fellow as yourself, I am Hashem” (Vayikra 19:17, 18).
The Ibn Ezra makes a fundamental observation into two of these pesukim. He says that the pasuk of “You shall not hate your brother” is the opposite of “you shall love your fellow as yourself.” He further says that behold, these mitzvos are implanted in one’s heart. By observing them we can stay settled in The Land of Israel, for as we know, it was because of baseless hatred the Second Beis HaMikdash was destroyed. The pasuk continues: “you shall reprove your fellow,” which the Ibn Ezra explains  the reason for reproof, is because maybe you suspect him of some wrongdoing, which didn’t happen. The Ibn Ezra concludes that this is the reason why the pasuk ends by saying: “and do not bear a sin because of him;” because there will be punishment on you for what you thought about him. (Click here for Hebrew text.)

In the next pasuk the Ibn Ezra first points out that the explanations of “don’t take revenge” or “bear a grudge” can be found in Chaza”l (see Rashi on this pasuk.) Then he brings two definitions of “you shall love your fellow as yourself.” Many people say that the letter lamed in the pasuk is extra, like the “lamed” in “L’Avner” (Shmuel Beis 3:30), meaning, ‘love your neighbor as yourself.’ However the Ibn Ezra personally says: “I believe it is as it sounds as it is that one should love the good that comes to his friend just as if it happened to him.” And the reason the pasuk concludes “I am Hashem” is because “I am the one G-D, I created all of you.” (Click here for Hebrew text.)
The Ibn Ezra is explaining to us a major rule in the Torah! The punishment for this sin, as we experienced, is destruction and exile. The positive and negative mitzvos he says are total opposites. If you read the Ibn Ezra’s commentary closely, he seems to be explaining that these two pesukim are explaining each mitzvah from beginning to end. “You shall not hate your brother in your heart,” refers to baseless hatred, which  happens if one is quick to judgement and dislikes a person for doing things, whether to that individual or in general, that are not good. One might feel he wants to take revenge for that wrongdoing or at least bear a grudge against him or her; but what he has a mitzvah to do,and is supposed to do is confront the person and question what happened, because perhaps the suspicion was inaccurate. On the other hand, many people say that the positive mitzvah is to love your fellow as yourself. You wouldn’t want people to suspect you of doing something you didn’t, and you certainly don’t want others to bear a grudge or, worse, take revenge upon you.

These opposite mitzvos make sense, but the Ibn Ezra says he has a different understanding of “Loving your fellow as yourself,” which is to love the good things that come to your fellow as if they were yours, the same way you would appreciate the good that happens to you. Meaning, the Ibn Ezra’s focus of loving your fellow is not on how to treat the person, but how to treat his possessions or good tidings. How does that fit with being the opposite of not hating your brother in your heart, which seems to be clearly talking about how not to treat the individual himself, rather than his possessions or good tidings? Why does the Ibn Ezra call them opposite mitzvos?
The Ibn Ezra seems to be tying the last part of the pasuk with the middle saying, that the means to appreciate the good that others have received is through introspection and the realization that you and him or her both come from the same source. The One Hashem created both of you. It would seem natural that if a person truly realizes and feels this bond and relationship with his fellow Jew, a commonality of sorts that we all come from the same source, then inherently we will care about our fellow Jew and his possessions or good tidings as if they are our very own.

On the other hand, the opposite could also happen. If we don’t imbibe the deep faith that we are all created from the same source, then we can come to view our fellow Jew as someone different, a stranger, and people inherently have a disconnect that leads to hatred for one’s fellow man. Ideally viewing ourselves from the same source will save us from this inner hatred but if the hatred seeps in the Torah gives us a solution to get rid of it by telling us to confront the individual and rebuke him or her. In this way it will resolve any issues or friction against him or her.

In fact we can now appreciate the severity of each mitzvah and why transgressing them can lead to destruction and exile; for observing the mitzvah of loving one’s fellow is living by the belief that we are all created from one G-D, and we have a mitzvah to feel and live that way amongst our fellow Jew. However, G-D forbid we don’t live our lives in that manner, then our feeling is a disconnect which is like we came from more than one source, chas vishalom, the polar opposite.

The Ibn Ezra sums it up nicely in the next pasuk which discusses the prohibition of crossbreeding animals: “And the reason to mention ‘You shall not crossbreed your livestock with different species,’ (Vayikra 19:19) is to warn us that after we are Holy, that we don’t do any corruption toward our fellow man, so to one should not change the way Hashem intended for animals to be made, and this is why that pasuk starts off with, ‘You shall observe My statutes,’ (verse 19).” Everything goes back to the source of Hashem is One with a plan and actions of how He created and expects the world to exist.

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Chapter 2, Halacha 3, footnote at the end of note 4, note 5 and 6

We clarified a few details on Apei Tlasa today. 
1. On a footnote at the end of note 4 we discussed that according to the Rambam, the Chofetz Chaim suggests, that it is only permissible to throw into a conversation the lashon hara you heard with at least two other people only if it is known that the person you are telling already know about it. But if he doesn’t know, even if he will eventually know you can’t be the one to reveal it. Then the question is how do you know if everyone knows. There is no set time given and in fact every place is different. You can’t expect word to travel everywhere within an hour in a big city, for example. The Chofetz Chaim concludes that he is anyways not sure if this idea is true because no one else seems to say it has to be known by everyone before repeating it, just that it will be known. 
2. In note 5 the Chofetz Chaim points out that the lashon hara he’s been talking about isn’t just flat out insults or degradation but anything that might lead to harm whether financially or physically or embarrassment. 
3. In note 6 the Chofetz Chaim dealt with a pressing issue of how the Rashbam seems to permit telling the one who was talked about in front of 3 people what was said about him. Isn’t that flat out rechilus, and can just cause major arguments? The Chofetz Chaim says that granted one cannot purposefully tattle on the person who spoke lashon hara to the one it was spoken about certainly not to divulge who said it, just to start a fight, but since everyone will find out what happens anyways, what was said and who said what then even if it wasn’t within a different conversation, as long as you don’t exaggerate what happened the person who heard the lashon hara among at least three other can repeat it to the one it was spoken about because the Smag who explains the Rashbam throws in that a talebearer is one who reveals secrets not one who says something which everyone knows about already. 

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Torah Riddles Test #34

  1. Question: Why do two sets of witnesses combine to testify about what happened in the middle even if they saw it from opposite side windows and the public domain is in the middle but a group of people on either side of a public domain who can even see each other cannot combine for a zimun of Birkas hamazon?

 Background:

 A. The testimony case is a Mishna in Makkos daf 6b and the question is asked by the Responsa Hilchos Ketanos volume 2 chapter 147 based on a Beis Yosef in Orah Chaim chapter 195 in the name of the R”I.

B. The answer is not like the Aruch Laner who said the case in Makkos is not dealing with a public domain in the middle.

C. What is the “combine” factor that is by testimony but is not there by a zimun?

Answer: By a zimun if the public domain is in between the group they are not considered together and there is nothing to combine them. However by testimony where they in fact come together in court to testify that is considered a form of combining, it is just that in order to be considered one group some of them have to see each other as well when they witness what they are testifying about.

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Torah Riddles Test #33

  1. Question: How can you rely on a posek to poskin if we don’t rely on one witness?

Background:

 A. A single witness is not believed against a chazaka/ halachically presumed assumption to testify about something in reality. An example is a person saying a certain animal or bird is of the permitted species even though it has a chazaka of not being from the permitted species.

 B. The rabbi who is clarifying an issue (not one which is explicitly verifiable in sources) and using his own reasoning to resolve the issue might decide something which is going against the prevailing chazaka. How can he do that?

C. Why would one person deciding something in halacha against a chazaka be any different than one person testifying about the reality of something against the prevalent chazaka?

Answer: The witness is testifying head on directly against the chazaka therefore he isn’t believed against it. But the rabbi is clarifying an issue which might affect other things in Halacha but also affects this very chazaka so since he is not directly going up against the chazaka he is believed to clarify the Halacha which happens to contradict the chazaka. Or you can say that the witness is trying to make up something new which is against what was originally thought but the rabbi is just uncovering something that was unclear before.

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Acharei Mos – Focus

I have many times heard that people wish or feel they should be able to express their love for G-D and worship Him in whatever manner they feel comfortable doing. Where, when, how, and what – on their own terms. Why? Because if they can do it their way, they can show the most optimal dedication, love, and joy that they can possibly feel towards G-D, when they are ready to do it. Why all the restrictions?

An answer to this attitude can be found in the middle of this week’s Torah portion of Acharei Mos, when discussing the prohibition against bringing an offering outside the Mishkan or Beis HaMikdash. The Torah relates: “And Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying: Speak to Aharon and to his sons…Any man of the House of Israel, who slaughters an ox, a lamb, or a goat inside the camp, or who slaughters outside the camp, but does not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer up as a sacrifice to Hashem before the Mishkan of Hashem, this [act] shall be counted for that man as blood, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people; in order that the children of Israel should bring their offerings which they slaughter on the open field, and bring them to Hashem, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to the kohen, and slaughter them as peace offerings to Hashem…And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices to the demons after which they stray. This shall be an eternal statute for them, for [all] their generations” (Vayikra 17:1-7).

The Ibn Ezra points out that Aharon and his sons were singled out by this prohibition before everyone else, because at that time the kohanim were for the most part the shochtim, the butcherers, of the Jewish people. The Ibn Ezra also mentions that this mitzvah applies not only in the Mishkan, but for the Beis HaMikdash as well. All sacrifices must be brought to the Beis HaMikdash to be offered to Hashem. The Ibn Ezra also explains in pasuk 5: “in order that the children of Israel should bring” is the reason for this mitzvah, and the explanation of “on the open field” is that it refers to pasuk 7 “And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices.” The demons that pasuk 7 speaks about are called “sheidim” in Hebrew but the pasuk refers to them as “seirim,” the Ibn Ezra says it is because they would cause people who see them to tremble or because crazy people would witness them in the form of goats. Indeed, the reason why the Torah says they shall “no longer” slaughter is because the Jews use to in Egypt which is considered straying from Hashem, and the Ibn Ezra says: “Because anyone who seeks them and believes in them strays from Hashem for he thinks that there is something other than Hashem The Honorable and Awesome who can make good or bad.”

The Avi Ezri, a commentary on the Ibn Ezra, says that in pasuk 5 the Ibn Ezra is explaining “that the main reason for this mitzvah is in order so that they will not sacrifice to demons which they were used to doing in Egypt, therefore all offerings shall be brought to the Beis HaMikdash.” He concludes by saying: “And I already explained that there are many open and hidden reasons for the burnt and peace offering and all who know and understand them can give the correct, praiseworthy reason, as long as your intent is for Hashem on High.” (Click here for Hebrew text.)

A very bizarre thing is happening here. A person wants to bring a sacrifice to Hashem, showing his love and devotion to Him – but he doesn’t want to, or can’t, shlep all the way to Jerusalem to bring it in the Beis HaMikdash. He would rather do it in his backyard or someplace else. What’s wrong with that? And why would that lead to sacrificing to demons which his ancestors did hundreds of years ago in Egypt, before all the miracles of the Exodus and the giving of the Torah?

It would seem that even though this person has complete devotion to Hashem right now, if he were to continue to sacrifice outside the allotted place of the Mishkan or Beis HaMikdash, then he would revert back to his ancestors’ old ways. How is that possible? Because by requiring the sacrificial service to be in the House of G-D, in a central location Hashem is causing us to focus on what we are doing and on Him. Without that focus it is possible for a person’s mind to go astray or mixed up and decide to do something strange like reverting back to his ancestors’ ways of worshiping demons.
So a person could have all the right reasons for serving Hashem, but if he wants to do it his way and not the way Hashem wants it to be done, then he might lose focus and stray from Hashem.

This does not mean that Judaism is rigid and that there is no room for expressing one’s personality and creativity. Everyone is an individual with their own mind, different means, and unique circumstances. For example, the Torah does not say one can only sacrifice  bulls worth one thousand dollars. There is a selection of sacrifices based on one’s means. There is no Jewish law that says one must wear black and white, rather there is a dress code which is based on modesty, looking elegantly conservative. So there is room for creativity as well. There is no one way to make your food on Shabbos or Yom Tov, or what you can eat during the week, rather there are guidelines.

So there is room to express oneself within the framework of Jewish law but it must be done within the framework in order to keep on the Path of Hashem.


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Sefer Chofetz Chaim Chapter 2, Halacha 3, most of Note 4

Today we continued in the Sefer Chofetz Chaim. We discussed a very challenging problem. How does word presumed to be spread if it is forbidden to be said? The Chofetz Chaim compared it to a group of thieves that are traveling together. You wouldn’t say that the first person to steal something is innocent because the rest of the group would have stolen it any way! So to the fact that one person of a group of at least 3 happened to have leaked loshon hara amidst a conversation about something else should mean he does not get a sin, as the Rambam says, because bottom line he spoke badly about someone else who care if word spreads. And how then can word spread if no one is allowed to start spreading it?
The Chofetz Chaim explained 3 views of how to resolve this issue:

1. Rashi in Erechin who said that the case of Rabba bar Rav Huna and word spreading is where the original speaker is talking about himself so he is automatically giving permission to spread what he said about himself, good or bad, if he is willing to say it in a group of at least 3 people.

2. The Rashbam in Bava Basra only permits those in the group to go back to the one who was talked about but not say it to any one else. If the speaker was willing to say what he said in a group of at least 3 he must not care if word gets back to the one being talked about. Granted it might start quarrels, but the Chofetz Chaim seems to be saying that is not the repeater’s responsibility, the original speaker is instigating.

3. The Rambam in halacha 5 of Hilchos Deos, chapter 7 says one does not get a sin if he happened to slip into a conversation this pice of lashon hara that he heard in a group of 3, without intent of spreading the news because he is not acting as a peddler, which is what the Torah describes one who speaks lashon hara as. A peddler is one who takes his goods from one place to another sharing or selling them to others but in this case since word will spread or already has spread in an illegal or legal manner, then the person who slips it into his conversation is not acting as a peddler since he is not giving out information which people don’t already have or won’t have easy access to and there is no intent to act as a peddler in this case of spreading the news, therefore he does not get a sin.

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Torah Riddles Test #32

Question: Why does the concept of “toch kidei dibur” work to correct oneself if he says the wrong day of the Omer but not if he mentions Shabbos instead of Yom Tov in his shemone esray?

Background:

 A. “Toch kidei dibur” is the concept of realizing one made a mistake and immediately correcting himself within a certain short amount of time which is the amount of time it takes for a student to greet his rebbe saying, “Shalom aleichem rebbe umoreh.”

B. The Mishna Berura (Orach Chaim 488:6:32) says “they further write that if one makes a mistake and says ‘today is the fourth day of the omer’ and toch kidei dibur remembers it is the fifth day, it is enough to just finish ‘fifth of the Omer’ and he fulfills the mitzvah even if he didn’t say ‘today is the fifth day’ since it was still within the allotted time of correction.

C. If one on Yom Tov says “mikadesh hashabbos” instead of “mikadesh Yisrael vihazmanim,” the Mishna Berura (487:3) says one must go back and say “mikadesh Yisrael vihazmanim” and it’s not enough just to correct oneself toch kidei dibur and say “Yisrael vihazmanim” after concluding “mikadesh hashabbos.”

D. When Yom Tov falls out on Shabbos we say in our shemone esray “mikadesh hashabbos Yisrael vihazmanim.”

Answer: Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach explains that it is not recognizable that you are correcting the mistake you made since that is just what you say on Shabbos Yom Tov but by the Omer it does look like he is correcting himself since one does not count twice in one day. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura there note 68.) [/exapnd]

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Torah Riddles Test #31

  1. Question: Why in England and places similar to it can they rely on the leniency that in 3 days wheat seeds will take root before the counting of the Omer in regards to yoshon?

 Background:

 A. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 489:10) says it is forbidden to eat from the new grain even nowadays…until the beginning of the night of the 18th of Nissan, and in Israel until the beginning of the night of the 17th of Nissan. (The Mishna Berura and Beur Halacha there explain at length how people nowadays are lenient in this halacha.)

 B. The Mishna Berura in note 44 says that which is forbidden from the new grain to eat is grain that took root after the 16th of Nissan which is when they used to bring the Omer offering. If the grains took root before the Omer, the Omer made them permissible to eat. This mitzvah only applies to the five types of grain, wheat, barley, spelt, rye, and oats.

C. There is an argument between the Sha”ch and Terumas Hadeshen whether it takes two weeks for these grains to take root or 3 days. (See Shach in Yoreh Deah 293:2 and Nekudas HaKesef there.)

D. The Responsa of the Minchas Yitzchok (Volume 6, chapter 43) says places like England can rely on the Terumas Hadeshen that it takes 3 days for the grain to take root, why?

Answer: It rains a lot in England so roots take root quicker.