Category: Torah Riddles

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Torah Riddles Test #41

  1. Question: Why doesn’t Tosefes Yom Tov, taking on Yom Tov early in regards to prohibiting yourself from doing melacha before sunset, not contradict the 49 complete days of the Omer but saying kiddush and maariv before nighttime does?

Background:

A. The Mishna Berura (494:1:1) says that maariv should be pushed off to later on the first night of Shavuos until the stars come and it is completely night so that the days of the counting of Omer will be 49 complete days.

B. The Pri Megadim says this applies to saying kiddush also, if one would eat first then Daven maariv in a set minyan or for a woman who is alone and is not davening maariv.

 C. Rav Nosson Karelitz says one can accept upon himself “Tosefes Yom Tov” because that doesn’t take away from the completeness of 49 full days it is just that one cannot do any melacha because he took upon himself Tosefes Yom Tov.

Answer: Davening maariv or saying kiddush is an action which actively shows they are moving on to the next day so if done earlier they are not completing the 49 days of counting. Whereas refraining from doing malacha is passive, all it is taking a vow not to do any work for a certain time period for the sake of honoring the Yom Tov but it does not show that they are ready to move on to the next day. (See footnote 1 and 2 in Dirshu there.)

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Torah Riddles Test #40

  1. Question: Why can a single Jewish witness absolve himself from paying for what he forced his fellow Jew to pay in non-Jewish court by claiming he was just telling the truth but if a person forcefully takes away something from one person in front of two witnesses which supposedly belongs to his friend and his friend skips town, he must pay back the guy he “stole” from because he is only one witness that says it belongs to his friend even if he claims he is telling the truth?

Background:

A. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 28:3) presents a case where a non-Jew brings a Jew to non-Jewish court claiming he is owed money and a single Jewish witness testifies against his fellow Jew. The Shulchan Aruch says that the witness is excommunicated for testifying by himself against a fellow Jew and it is in fact forbidden to do. However the Rema adds that he would not have to pay for the loss of money he caused his fellow Jew to receive because he can claim “I was just telling the truth,” and in fact the Rema says in si’if 4 that if it were two witnesses that testified against the Jew in non-Jewish court that would be fine because they can do the same in Jewish court. Of course if the witness was lying he’d have to pay.

B. The Ketzos in footnote 4 adds that if the one witness was a relative of the Jew or invalid to testify in Jewish court then he feels he should have to pay for the loss he caused to his fellow Jew even if he claims he was telling the truth because he is an invalid witness whereas the single kosher witness is still a witness he just can’t testify without someone else in Jewish court.

Answer: . The person who grabbed from his fellow for his friend has no proof that he is telling the truth and he lost his credentials of being honest by looking like he is stealing from the person he grabbed from, whereas the single witness in non-Jewish wasn’t acting the way things should be done in Jewish court but there is no reason to think he lost his credentials of being a trustworthy honest Jew.

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Torah Riddles Test #39

  1. Question: Why can a Jew make a deal with a non-Jew to take care of his vineyard and eat its grapes in exchange for the non-Jew working on his vineyard and eating those grapes during the 3 years of orlah but if they were partners in one field the non-Jew cannot just work on it the first 3 years and eat from its fruit and then the Jew eat for the next 3 years and eat the same amount of fruit as his non-Jewish partner ate the first 3 years?

Background:

 A. Orlah is the Halacha that for the first 3 years after a Jew plants a tree he cannot eat from its fruits.

B. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 294:13) poskins like the Rambam that by a partnership of a Jew and non-Jew, none of them can eat fruit from the tree for the first 3 years after planting unless a specific condition was made for the non-Jew to eat the fruits for the first 3 years and the Jew for the next 3 years. But the condition cannot be conditional on each one getting the same and equal amount of fruit because that would be trading orlah fruit for regular fruit.

C. In si’if 14 the Shulchan Aruch allows one to ask a non-Jew to work his vineyard and eat the fruits produce during the years of orlah while the Jew works on the non-Jews vineyard during those 3 years and eats the same amount of fruit.

 D. Everyone agrees that one can sell his orlah fruit for money when one first plants his tree (See si’if 15.)

Answer: Trading one’s land for the non-Jew’s land to work the land along with eating his fruits is more like a sale than a trade because he is selling his field in exchange for working and taking care of his field. This is totally permissible, unlike just a trade of fruit for fruit. (See Taz there note 22.)

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Torah Riddles Test #38

  1. Question: Why should a majority be used to decide that a sheep already counted and then remixed into the pen can be ignored or nullified regarding taking tithes of animals but we can’t use a majority to nullify a string of wool which was not twirled for the sake of the mitzvah of tzitzis and got mixed up with other strings that were woven for the sake of the mitzvah?

Background:

A. The Oneg Yom Tov (siman 2) says that if strings twirled not for the sake of the mitzvah of tzitzis are mixed in a pile of strings that were twirled for the mitzvah one cannot use a majority to nullify the invalid ones because nullifying in a majority only works when stuff that are forbidden fall into stuff that are permissible where nullifying the majority removes the issue of prohibition but here the nullifying in majority is being used to make the strands of tzitzis kosher that were twirled not for the sake of the mitzvah and we don’t find anywhere a concept of nullifying like that.

 B. The Gemara in Bava Metzia 6b says that if one of the sheep that was already counted for tithes jumped back into the pen and got mixed up then all of them are exempt from tithing.Tosfos there asks and leaves the question unanswered, why not say that that sheep should be nullified in the majority and all then should be counted in the count of tithing? Problem is that means the majority is actually adding a new din of untithed to the animal that was already counted. It didn’t just nullify that animal because it will be part of the count again which is a question on the Oneg Yom Tov.

C. Chakira in tithing animals: (a) Does the obligation of tithing animals come off by itself once it is counted or (b) really each animal is obligated to be tithed but once they are counted they are exempted from animal tithing.

Answer: If you say like the second side that really each animal is obligated in tithing but is exempted after being counted then Tosfos question makes sense because the nullification through majority takes away the exemption of being counted already and automatically all that is left is the obligation of tithing an animal which by itself it is liable for. Just to clarify, by the tithing of the sheep the obligation of tithing is always on the animal but it is exempted one counted so the majority removes that exemption and the sheep is left with an obligation again which it always has but by the tzitzis, it started off not being made kosherly and the majority would be used to transform it into something kosher which it can’t do.

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Torah Riddles Test #37

  1. Question: Why aren’t we concerned about many sins being transgressed when checking to see if the tzitzis on a Tallis is kosher before donning the tallis but we are concerned about many sins being transgressed when taking care of a sick person in danger on Shabbos, at least according to the Ra”n?

Background:

A. The Shulchan Aruch by the laws of tzitzis (8:9) says that before one makes a blessing upon donning a Tallis he should be sure the tzitzis strings have not torn so that he would not say a wasted blessing. The Mishna Berura there explains that granted there is a possibility of not wearing a kosher pair of tzitzis but one can rely on a chazaka/halachic assumption that nothing has changed since he wore them last. But for the stringent matter of saying Hashem’s name in vain we are extra strict to check that everything is kosher.

B. The Ra”n quoted in the Beis Yosef (Orach Chaim 328) says it is better to transgress the Shabbos prohibition of slaughtering a kosher animal for a dangerously ill person then to feed him non-kosher meat on Shabbos. The reason being is that it is better to do an act of a sin once even if that particular sin is normally more severe i.e. slaughtering on Shabbos, then many acts of sin, i.e. each time he eats a kazayis of non-kosher meat.

 C. The same should be the concern by the Tallis that every moment of wearing a non-kosher tallis is a sin which we should be more concerned about then one blessing that was made for naught. D. A chazaka deals with the present situation not the future.

Answer: When it comes to Shabbos what has to be weighed are the needs of the sick person and the amount of sins potentially transgressed to save him, what is the easiest way to heal him. The Ra”n holds that if feeding him non-kosher is the same as feeding him kosher meat which must be slaughtered on Shabbos then it is better to shecht one time on Shabbos then for him to eat numerous kazaysim of non-kosher meat. But by tzitzis what is really happening is that we are relying on a chazaka and a chazaka only takes care of the issue at present so when looking at each issue presently we’ll say that the chazaka takes care of the mitzvah of tzitzis to be sure it is kosher but we are more stringent by saying G-D’s name in vain so we don’t rely on the chazaka for that matter.

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Torah Riddles Test #36

  1. Question: Why doesn’t one’s courtyard automatically acquires eggs in a nest for the one who buys the courtyard in regards to the mitzvah of shooing away the mother bird?

Background:

  1. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 292:2) say in regards to this mitzvah, “Any nest which is supposed to be by you like doves that you are normally raising in one’s house or ducks or chickens that one bought with the house are exempt from this mitzvah . But doves of a dovecote and on top of them are birds that were acquired with earthenware vessels that are built into the walls and birds hang out there, or in pits, as well as ducks and chickens bought with an orchard are liable to be shooed away in order to take the eggs. But this is only as long as the mother bird has not lifted itself from her eggs at all from when they were going to take them. But if she has been raised from the nest and her eggs and the place is his, then his courtyard does acquire them for him and he is exempt from the mitzvah.
  2. The Shach in siif katan 5 says the owner of the courtyard either got the bird to fly high enough that he can’t really get to it as mentioned in si’if 4 or if the bird on her own flew up high enough that she is not touching the nest or chicks with her wings then he is exempt from the mitzvah .
  3. There is a rule that one’s courtyard is like one’s hands, it is an extention of one’s hand, so it can make acquisitions for you like a woman’s courtyard can accept a divorce bill for her from her husband if thrown into her property, just as if it was given to her in her hand.

Answer: The Shach in siif katan 4 says that as long as the bird has not been raised from the nest then his courtyard cannot acquire the eggs for him because since one cannot acquire the eggs by himself as long as the mother bird is on the nest so to ones courtyard cannot acquire them for your since if you can’t your courtyard can’t either. The courtyard is only an extension of your hand.

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Torah Riddles Test #35

  1. Question: Why can’t a woman ideally get married (though if she does she can stay married) if there is one witness who says her husband dies and another witness comes and says he did not die?

Background:

  1. The Gemara in Kesubos 22b concludes in the name of Rebbe Yochanan that if one witness says he is dead and another witness says he is not dead she should not get married but if she does she need not divorce the second guy. The gemara adds that this is based on a ruling by Ulla that whenever the Torah believes one witness he is treated as two witnesses. So the one who says he did not die is one witness verses two witnesses, (for only the one who says he did die is treated as two witnesses leniently.)
  2. Rashi says we treat him as two witnesses to say he died, as we say in the beginning of the tenth chapter of Yevamos, because we are so strict with her in the end, by punishing her very much if she does not cross check that her husband is really dead, as enumerated in the Mishna there, therefore we are lenient on her in the beginning to accept one witness.
  3. The Gemara then asks why she can’t ideally get remarried if one witness has the same status as two. The gemara concludes with a verse in Mishlei (Proverbs 4:24): “Take crooked speech away from yourself, and put devious lips far away from you.”

Answer: She wouldn’t be careful enough to checkout if her husband really is dead before getting remarried, if she would have been permitted to remarry ideally.

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Torah Riddles Test #34

  1. Question: Why do two sets of witnesses combine to testify about what happened in the middle even if they saw it from opposite side windows and the public domain is in the middle but a group of people on either side of a public domain who can even see each other cannot combine for a zimun of Birkas hamazon?

 Background:

 A. The testimony case is a Mishna in Makkos daf 6b and the question is asked by the Responsa Hilchos Ketanos volume 2 chapter 147 based on a Beis Yosef in Orah Chaim chapter 195 in the name of the R”I.

B. The answer is not like the Aruch Laner who said the case in Makkos is not dealing with a public domain in the middle.

C. What is the “combine” factor that is by testimony but is not there by a zimun?

Answer: By a zimun if the public domain is in between the group they are not considered together and there is nothing to combine them. However by testimony where they in fact come together in court to testify that is considered a form of combining, it is just that in order to be considered one group some of them have to see each other as well when they witness what they are testifying about.

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Torah Riddles Test #33

  1. Question: How can you rely on a posek to poskin if we don’t rely on one witness?

Background:

 A. A single witness is not believed against a chazaka/ halachically presumed assumption to testify about something in reality. An example is a person saying a certain animal or bird is of the permitted species even though it has a chazaka of not being from the permitted species.

 B. The rabbi who is clarifying an issue (not one which is explicitly verifiable in sources) and using his own reasoning to resolve the issue might decide something which is going against the prevailing chazaka. How can he do that?

C. Why would one person deciding something in halacha against a chazaka be any different than one person testifying about the reality of something against the prevalent chazaka?

Answer: The witness is testifying head on directly against the chazaka therefore he isn’t believed against it. But the rabbi is clarifying an issue which might affect other things in Halacha but also affects this very chazaka so since he is not directly going up against the chazaka he is believed to clarify the Halacha which happens to contradict the chazaka. Or you can say that the witness is trying to make up something new which is against what was originally thought but the rabbi is just uncovering something that was unclear before.

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Torah Riddles Test #32

Question: Why does the concept of “toch kidei dibur” work to correct oneself if he says the wrong day of the Omer but not if he mentions Shabbos instead of Yom Tov in his shemone esray?

Background:

 A. “Toch kidei dibur” is the concept of realizing one made a mistake and immediately correcting himself within a certain short amount of time which is the amount of time it takes for a student to greet his rebbe saying, “Shalom aleichem rebbe umoreh.”

B. The Mishna Berura (Orach Chaim 488:6:32) says “they further write that if one makes a mistake and says ‘today is the fourth day of the omer’ and toch kidei dibur remembers it is the fifth day, it is enough to just finish ‘fifth of the Omer’ and he fulfills the mitzvah even if he didn’t say ‘today is the fifth day’ since it was still within the allotted time of correction.

C. If one on Yom Tov says “mikadesh hashabbos” instead of “mikadesh Yisrael vihazmanim,” the Mishna Berura (487:3) says one must go back and say “mikadesh Yisrael vihazmanim” and it’s not enough just to correct oneself toch kidei dibur and say “Yisrael vihazmanim” after concluding “mikadesh hashabbos.”

D. When Yom Tov falls out on Shabbos we say in our shemone esray “mikadesh hashabbos Yisrael vihazmanim.”

Answer: Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach explains that it is not recognizable that you are correcting the mistake you made since that is just what you say on Shabbos Yom Tov but by the Omer it does look like he is correcting himself since one does not count twice in one day. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura there note 68.) [/exapnd]