Vayakhel – Seeing Hashem’s Kindness in Everything He Does

In accordance with the doctrine of free will, “R. Eleazar said: From the Torah, the Neviim (Prophets) and the Kesuvim (Writings) it may be shown that one is allowed to follow the road he wishes to pursue” (Makkos 10b). Rashi on that piece explains that ‘the way you wish to travel [Hashem will allow it whether for good or for bad].’ Rashi explains in the pesukim of the Kesuvim where the gemara quoted a pasuk in Mishlei: “If he is of the scorners, he will [be allowed to] speak scorn” (Mishlei 3:34), that if a person wants to associate with scoffers, Hashem will not stop him or her. We see from here that Hashem allows us free choice; he doesn’t actively help us, at least on the wrong path, but he passively allows us to make mistakes if we want. Hashem, though, does help us try to find the right path when we are searching for it. (Click here for Hebrew text.)
For example, there is a Ramban by the mitzvah of teshuva [repentance] that says that one who comes to purify himself, Hashem will help him (See Chidushei HaLev Devarim 30:6, page 175).

In a similar vein, the Chovos HaLevavos at the beginning of the Gate of  Trust in Hashem says: “Among its benefits to him in religious life is tranquility of soul in reliance of Hashem, may He be exalted, just as the servant is bound to rely on his master. For if a person does not put his trust in Hashem, he places his trust in what is other than Hashem; and whoever trusts in what is other than Hashem, Hashem removes His providence from him and leaves him in the hands of whatever he trusts in.” The Lev Tov adds that one who has complete trust in Hashem has no worries whatsoever, and it is impossible to be free from any worries unless one trusts in only Hashem. For if not for this trust in Hashem, he would have to trust in other people, who are finite and imperfect like him, or he would have to trust in himself, his wealth, brains, or strength, or the like, all of which have their fallacies and reasons to be worried. But with Hashem, who is all knowing, and is by definition completely good and kind, as well as omnipotent – there is absolutely nothing to worry about. Yet if the individual is not holding on a level of complete trust in Hashem, Hashem removes His focus of security on that person, and allows that person to trust in whatever he feels most comfortable with. This is because a person must always trust in something, but it is at the risk of it being in the hands of mere mortals. (Click here for Hebrew text.)

In the beginning of this week’s Torah portion of Vayakhel, the Rabbeinu Bachye observes that the first pasuk says: “These are the things that Hashem has commanded to do them” (Shemos 35:1). Then in the next pasuk Hashem says: “Six days work shall be done for you.” This is coming to teach us that the  work on the Mishkan (Tabernacle) was commanded by Hashemto be done for six days during the week but not on Shabbos, for work on the Mishkan did not push off Shabbos. The reason why the pasuk says “work shall be done for you” and not “you shall do work” is to show us the lesson that when the Jews do the will of Hashem their work will be done for them by others. And when they don’t do His will, they will do their own work, but not only that, but the work of others will be done by them as well. This is based on a Mechilta in the beginning of Ki Sisa and summarized in the Mechilta in the beginning of Vayakhel. The Rabbeinu Bachye concludes that when the Mechilta says “You will do it” it implies even [jobs of] others as well. (Click here for Hebrew text)

There seems to be a common thread going through all the above quoted Chazals, that being, that if one fully embraces Hashem with complete trust, and is completely doing Hashem’s will, then he is in Hashem’s “hands;” he has no worries; everything will get done for Him while he is doing Hashem’s will, and Hashem will help Him stay on the right path. However, consequently, if one decides to take their own path, or trusts in something or someone other than Hashem (and this implies even a slight varying from complete trust in Hashem), then he compromises this foolproof protection plan which he had with Hashem. He then has to rely upon who and what he decided to trust in, albeit this might vary in degrees depending on the correlation of trust in Hashem and others. This can also be applied to doing the will of Hashem, for if one deviates, even ever so slightly, from Hashem’s will, he then has to start fending for himself, and not only that, he might even be forced into taking on other people’s work as well, presumably all within various levels, depending on how far off or how close one stays to doing Hashem’s will. The Maharsha illustrates this concept by the Gemara in Sanhedrin 99b which says: “R. Eleazar said: Every man is born to toil, as it is written, ‘Because man is born to toil’ (Iyov 5:7). Now, I do not know whether to toil by mouth or by hand, but when it is said, for his mouth crave it of him, I may deduce that toil by mouth is meant.  Yet I still do not know whether for toil in the Torah or in [secular] conversation, but when it is said, ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart out of your mouth’ (Yehoshua 1:8),  I conclude that one was created to labor in the Torah.” The Maharsha there says that the gemara originally thought that one must work because any set time of Torah learning which isn’t accompanied by a job will in the end  fall apart. However the Maharsha explains that the gemara concludes that one does not need a job, rather as mentioned in Brachos 35a, the original righteous people had Torah learning as their job, and any work they needed would be done for them by itself (somehow or another), and this was how creation from the beginning was meant to be (there is a medrish that states that before the sin, Adam was lying on a couch basking in Hashem’s Holy Presence and angels feeding him fruit). This was until Adam sinned and was punished with “the sweat of your brow shall you eat bread.” We see clearly that in an ideal world, where everyone is doing the will of Hashem to the utmost degree, everything will get done for them.

However, the reality is that we are not perfect, yet Hashem still showers us with kindness, even when we are doing the wrong thing. For example, it use to be in the times of the Beis HaMikdash if a person did a sin by accident he was able to receive atonement by bringing a sin-offering which is an animal brought as a sacrifice instead of him. If he did it on purpose, he was still showered with kindness,  depending on the severity of the sin he might have to pay back the victim, for example if he stole, and in that case  Hashem even rewards him with a mitzvah for returning the stolen object, or he might get lashes or even the death penalty, but all these are atonements which will help cleanse his soul before getting into the World to Come where he will bask in the Presence of Hashem, farther or closer, brighter or dimmer, depending on how many mitzvos one did and the quality or effort he put into them. Even if he does not get the atonement in this world, and he must suffer punishment in the next world, G-D forbid, it is still a kindness Hashem does, because Hashem is bleaching out all the sin and filth one stained his soul with in this world in order to be ready to receive his reward in the Next World.

Even Hashem letting us lead our life according to what we choose for good or for bad is a kindness because if we are not ready to fully embrace Hashem, he doesn’t force us and he wants us to find His way on our own, when we are ready, albeit dropping us hints to return to Him all the time. So to by allowing us to be able to trust in other things if we aren’t on the level to fully trust in Him is a kindness because granted we are left in the hands of mere mortals but at least we have something to trust in. Imagine having nothing to trust in and just groping for thin air because one isn’t ready to fully trust in Hashem, it would be even more depressing then trusting in anything else other than just Hashem.

However where is the kindness in forcing us to work for ourselves and doing work for others if we don’t completely do His will?

It would seem that there must be some kind of kindness in that as well. The simple understanding of the pasuk in Iyov quoted above, “For man is born to toil,” the Metzudas Dovid says, means that a person was created to work for his food not to take from others that which he didn’t earn or toil for. This means that if a person cannot reach the heights of doing Hashem’s will as described by the Maharsha above, where toiling in Torah and doing His will earns the right for his needs to be automatically taken care of somehow or another, then he must earn his pay some other way. If Hashem would allow him to get his needs without earning it, it would naturally be a tremendous embarrassment, so out of Hashem’s kindness, Hashem made it that if we don’t always do his will then we will have to work for ourselves and others in order to earn our livelihood and not be embarrassed of accepting freebies.

Hashem created this world with pure kindness and sustains it in the same manner, everything, whether it seems good or bad to the human eye is imbued with Hashem’s stamp of kindness in one form or another.

Chapter 2 Halacha 1 (part 1)

This chapter talks about the concept of “apei tilasa” which literally means “in front of 3” this refers to an ambiguous leniency in the laws of lashon hara. It is based on a Gemara in Bava Basra 39a, in the name of Rabba bar Rav Huna who says that anything said in front of 3 people is not considered lashon hara. The Chofetz Chaim makes it very clear that the bigger the crown the worse the lashon hara is. He proves it through logic and sources in the Sifri and other gemaras.

The Chofetz Chaim spends a lot of time elaborating on explaining what the Gemara in Bava Basra is talking about, going through all the Rishonim in order so that no one will be mistakenly think that it is straight out permissible to talk lashon hara in front of 3 people with no strings attached.

He starts with the Rashbam who says that it is certainly prohibited to say anything bad about anyone in front of 3 but once it was said any one of the 3 can repeat it to the one it was talked about because since it was said in front of 3 it is definite that it will get back to him anyway. I had a question why it would be permitted to tell the guy talked about since we learned that reinforcing what he already know is still bad like rubbing salt on an open wound?

Tosfos on 39b sounds like he is saying that even the one speaking the lashon hara is permitted in front of at least 3 because since word spreads n that dynamic it is like he said it to his face. The Chofetz Chaim had a lot of difficulty understanding what this means since you certainly can’t lie, that is motzie Shem ra, and even the truth, if said to his face is forbidden and a person who causes a public embarrassment has no share in the World to Come! Just calling him names has the same issue and even if we say if a guy is insulted he is allowed to insult back, so if he hears what the speaker said and told 3 people a response so they can now report it back to the speaker. That also doesn’t work because one can only respond to being insulted in public and to the guys face at the moment of insult and this is after the fact even if his response is considered to the insulter’s face, it is still lashon hara because the timing is off. So we are left with not understanding what Tosfos is saying and when exactly does the leniency of apei tlasa apply, to be continued…

Torah Riddles #14

  1. Question: Why do some hold one can make a shehecheyanu on buying new sefarim but not on a new pair of tefillin?

 Background:

a. The Magen Avrohom (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 223:5 brings the opinion of the Birkas Rm”m, but argues on him, who holds you do make a shehecheyanu on new sefarim but not tefillin. The Mahar”I Bei Rav brought in the Be’er Heitiv says you even make a shehecheyanu on buying a Sefer Torah.

b. The Rambam says you make a shehecheyanu on Tzitzis and tefillin just like you make a blessing on doing an mitzvah from time to time like lulav, Chanukah light, shofar etc.

c. The Tur argues and says you say a shehecheyanu on tzitzis because you bought new vessels or clothes. But not on tefillin because mitzvos are not to get personal benefit from.

Answer: The excitement of acquiring sefarim is not just in order to learn them which would fall into the category of mitzvos are not for personal benefit but there is an excitement in enlarging ones collection of sefarim and now having this specific Sefer or set, or a whole Sefer Torah added to his collection, that excitement according to these opinions would obligate a shehecheyanu but most people are only excited to get a pair of tefillin because now they can perform the mitzvah.

Torah Riddles Test #13

  1. Question: How should it be possible to differentiate between verses in a Torah scroll?

Background:

a. The Rema in Yoreh Deah 274:7 says an idea that the Shach (6) says should be done but not too much, to indicate an end of a verse, since one cannot write periods in a Torah scroll.

Answer: Make a little space between each verse.

Torah Riddles Test #12

  1. Question: What is the difference between putting a clay vessel in the oven right before Shabbos to finish hardening which Rashi in Shabbos 74b says does not constitute breaking Shabbos under the prohibition of makeh b’patish, i.e. giving the final blow to create an object, since the oven is doing it by itself and you are doing nothing to finish it, whereas the Even Ha’Ozer (Orach Chaim 328) says that putting in wheat kernels to be ground on Shabbos by a mill running on water does constitute breaking shabbos  and is forbidden (according to him on a Torah level and according to the Magen Avraham on a Rabbinic level) even though you aren’t directly grinding, the water is causing the machine to grind for you?

Background:

  1. The issue with the melacha of techina/grinding is the action of grinding.
  2. The issue with the melacha of makeh bipatish/doing the final blow is the result of a finished product.

Answer: You are responsible for causing the machine to grind by putting the kernels into the machine for it to be ground by the water since the issue is the action itself which you caused the machine to do so it is directly related to you since caused the water to start the process. Whereas by the clay vessel you just placed the vessel in the oven and the oven finished the job by itself, so since the issue is not the action the oven did but the results that it created then you aren’t directly responsible for what happened.

Torah Riddles Test #11

  1. Question: What is the difference between needing to reheat water for a baby who got a bris on Shabbos and the hot water prepared for a bath before Shabbos spilled before the bris, where the R”an permits doing the bris but he says one cannot shecht an animal on Yom Tov if he doesn’t have dirt prepared from before YomTov to fulfill the mitzvah of covering blood?

Background:

  1. The Raza”h says it is not permitted to do the bris on Shabbos if you know you are going to have to break Shabbos to heat up water once the baby is in a dangerous state and needs the hot water. Meaning you can’t put yourself in a position to be forced to break Shabbos in order to save some one’s life just to fulfill a mitzvah.
  2. The Ra”n in the name of the Ramban holds that there is a mitzvah right now in front of us which has to get done so take care of it and we’ll have to deal with the ramifications later, even if it means breaking Shabbos and heating water for a bath in order so that the baby will not becomes too weak.  At that point it is permissible to break Shabbos for the sake of the baby in order to avoid the situation of the baby becoming in danger.  When the bris was being done there was no immediate need to break Shabbos so it was not an immediate cause and effect.
  3. Why doesn’t the Ra”n say the same by the shechting case, that right now there is a mitzvah of shechting meat in order to eat for the sake of simchas Yom Tov and honoring the holiday with delicacies and after the mitzvah is done we’ll deal with the ramifications of needing to bring in some dirt from outside, which is muktzah on a rabbinic level, since it was not set aside from before yom tov, in order to cover the blood? But the Ra”n says the mitzvah of simchas Yom Tov is different than the mitzvah bris milah, why?

Answer: By the slaughtering you are directly causing the need of getting dirt from outside if it was not prepared before Yom Tov because the need to fulfill the mitzvah of covering blood is like the second part of the slaughtering. But need to heat up water in order to give the baby a bath so that he won’t be in danger is not a direct result of the bris, meaning it is not like the next step of a bris is to give a baby a hot bath, rather this is just an offshoot of what happens when the baby is in such trauma after having surgery, therefore the need to heat up water is indirectly caused by the bris and therefore is permissible.

Torah Riddles Test #10

  1. Question: If a person threw a glass vase off a roof and it was heading straight for a cushion which would save it from breaking but someone removed the cushion before it landed causing the vase break, why isn’t the guy who removed the cushion liable for opening a pit to break the vase?

Background:

  • The Steipler zt”l asked this question on the gemara in Bava Kama 26b in his Kehilos Yaakov 2:2 and brings the answer of Rav Avrohom Yaffin that he did create a pit but the Torah says one who creates a pit is not liable for damaged vessels.
  • Rashi on the gemara there says no one is liable because it was an indirect damage.
  • Creating or opening a pit doesn’t only apply to making a hole in the ground but creating or uncovering any stumbling block where someone or something like an animal can get hurt.
  • Rav Shainberg zt”l answers that this is not even considered opening a pit, why not?

Answer: One did not create or uncover a newly established stumbling block by removing the cushion, the ground is ground which G-D himself created, it is just that the force of gravity can cause the vase to break if it hits the ground, that is considered an indirect damage.

Torah Riddles Test #9

  1. Question: Why does the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 285:1) say if you only have enough money to buy only one item one should by tefillin and not a mezuzah?

Background:

  • The Shulchan Aruch says that one who is careful with fulfilling the mitzvah of mezuzah will merit long life for himself and his family.
  •  Mezuzah is a mitzvah that can be fulfilled every day of the year whereas tefillin are not adorned on Shabbos or Yom Tov.
  • If a person is a nomad living in tents in the desert or a sailor at sea, the mitzvah of mezuzah might never pertain to him just as a person who does not own a four cornered garment will never be required to don tzitzis.
  • As soon as a boy turns 13 he has an obligation to put on tefillin everyday besides Shabbos and Yom Tov.

Answer: Rebbe Akiva Aiger on the Shulchan Aruch says tefillin is an obligatory mitzvah in all circumstances except for its few exemptions on different parts of the year but mezuzah is only obligatory if you have a house with doorposts so it is possible a person might never need to fulfill that mitzvah just like tzitzis, therefore it is more important to buy tefillin then mezuzah even if currently you do have a house which is obligated in mezuzah.

Chapter 1 Halacha 9

The last Halacha in this chapter talks about not saying lashon hara about others even if you include yourself in what negative thing happened, and even if you were really talking negatively about yourself but you compare yourself to others either saying you are like them or even saying you are worse but they still are bad, that is still lashon hara about them and forbidden to say. Hashem was able to forgive what the prophet Yeshaya said about himself but not the fact that he demeaned the rest of the nation in the process, even though he had no intent of demeaning them. (See Yeshayahu 6:5, 6 with Rashi there.) For example one shouldn’t tell his friends or parents I failed my test but others did too and others got Ds while the smartest ones aced it. You can say I failed and I don’t know how the others did or just stay quiet about the others if anyone asks how the test went. 

Torah Riddles Test #8

  1. Question: Why can a judge help a litigant who is trying to say something but is having problems articulating but if he says he is owed a lesser amount then what he really is the judge cannot correct that?

Background:

 (A) The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat siman 17) says in si’if 9: “If a judge sees a winning argument for one of the litigants and the litigant is trying to say it but does not know how to properly put his words together or they see he is having a hard time trying to save himself with truthful claims and because of anger and frustration he is forgetting things or mixing things up out of foolishness, then a judge can help him and prepare the beginning of his statements because of the concept of ‘opening the mouth for the mute’. But he has to be very careful not to act like a lawyer.

(B) In si’if 12 The Rema says that if a claimant has a claim on his friend over a smaller amount of money and the judge sees that he is actually owed more money technically than what he is asking for, the judge can’t poskin that he should get more than what he is asking for and if he does it is a mistake in judgment and the extra money must be given back.

(C) The Shach (15) says we are not dealing with a case where he explicitly forgoes part of what he is owed, neither does it make sense that we know for sure that he is unaware of his mistaken claim.

Answer: In the latter case we don’t know whether he purposely is asking for less or not so the judge can’t say anything. But in the first case it is obvious that he was trying to say something it was just not coming out correctly so the judge is allowed to help him.