Torah Riddles Test #25

  1. Question: Why is taste of chometz absorbed in food more stringent than taste of chometz absorbed in a vessel on Pesach?

Background:

A. The Rema (467:10) holds that we have a custom to burn a chicken which has a cracked kernel of wheat found in it, and you can’t leave it until after Pesach even though the physical chometz was removed and only the taste is absorbed in the chicken.

B. The Shulchan Aruch (451:1) says that any earthen ware vessels that chometz like oatmeal, which one uses throughout the year should be washed off of all physical chometz and put away until after Pesach. The Mishna Berura (2) says this applies to any other type of vessel if you don’t want to kasher them.

C. The Chazon Ish (Orach Chaim 117:15) says that technically one does not have to sell any chometz which is absorbed in vessels though he does include them in the language of his document of selling chometz as a stringency to get rid of every last bit of chometz.

D. The Chazon Ish says that really absorbed taste of chometz cannot be sold because it has no physical substance to it but since the taste can come out of the wall of the vessel it can be considered physical so he stringently sold it but Rav Elyashiv and the Shulchan Aruch HaRav both say as long as there aren’t any physical chometz on vessels they don’t have to be sold before Pesach.

E. The Chazon Ish in note 12 said that absorbed taste in a vessel is like chometz which was left in rubble which isn’t edible.

Answer: The Dirshu Mishna Berura (451:1:2:2) quoting the Chazon Ish answers that taste of chometz absorbed in food is different from taste absorbed in vessels since it is still edible in food even though it is not physically there but when eating the chicken for example it is like you would eat the chometz absorbed inside it, with it, so it should be burned according to the Rema except in extenuating circumstances.

Torah Riddles Test #24

Question: Explain the argument between Rebbe Akiva Aiger and the Ra”n on whether nullifying chometz within a majority of non-chometz is different from nullifying sheep wool in a majority of camel wool to combine it with linen and not transgress shaatnez?

Background:

A. The Teshuvas HaRan (64) says that chometz before the time of being forbidden to own is nullified in non-chometz even though it is permitted food being mixed with permitted food. It is just like a Mishna in Kilayim 9:1 which says that sheep wool and camel mixed together, if the majority is camel wool than it can be interwoven into linen and it is not shaatnez because only wool from a sheep is forbidden to be mixed with linen and camels aren’t sheep and the sheep wool is nullified to the majority of camel wool, even if it is permissible wool being mixed with permissible wool since the sheep wool isn’t intertwined with the linen yet.

B. Rebbe Akiva Aiger says the cases are incomparable because the sheep wool has a forbidden name to it to be mixed with linen so it can be nullified in the camel wool as if it is forbidden stuff being nullified in permitted stuff. Whereas chometz has no connection to prohibition whatsoever before the forbidden time on the eve of Passover.

C. What is the reason for prohibition?

Answer: Rebbe Akiva Aiger holds the reason for prohibition by chometz is time so that is why it is different from shaatnez but the Ra”n holds the reason for prohibition is the item i.e. the chometz it is just restricted by time meaning it is only prohibited on Pesach just like shaatnez where the reason for prohibition is the sheep wool but only when mixed with linen.

Torah Riddles Test #23

Question:Why does the Rambam poskin you get makkos (lashes) if your flour ferments on Pesach or if you buy chometz on Pesach because it is a prohibition done through an action but the mitzvah of don’t covet, even if it leads to convincing the other to buy the object he covets is still not considered a prohibition done through an action and hence does not receive makkos?

Background:

A. The real prohibition by chometz is owning it which is not an action (it is a state of being) and lashes are only a punishment for prohibitive actions. However since the ownership comes through an action of baking or buying then the prohibition is considered an action (Rambam first chapter of halachic Chometz u’Matza)

B. The Rambam (Hilchos gezeila vi’aveida 1:10) poskins If a person forces someone to sell him something even if he paid a lot of money for it he still transgresses the sin of “Don’t covet” but does not receive lashes because it is a sin which is not done through an action, rather it is an emotion manifested in an action of a forced sale.

Answer: The forced sale only reveals how much one covets the other person’s object so the sin really is only the emotion but by chometz the sale or baking is the actual means to be in a state of ownership of chometz therefore the sin is a direct result of the action and punishable with lashes.

Torah Riddles Test #22

  1. Question: Why would you say both the paragraphs for Shabbos and Rosh Chodesh In benching at seuda shlishit if you bentched by night fall of a Shabbos where Rosh Chodesh starts that night but if Purim is on Friday and your Purim seuda runs into Shabbos then you only say the paragraph of Shabbos and not Purim in bentching?

Background:

 A. The Mishna Berura in 188:33 says the reason you say both by a Shabbos leading into Rosh Chodesh is because the paragraph for Shabbos is going on the beginning of the meal then we say the paragraph of Rosh Chodesh (or Yom Tov) afterwards which goes on the second half of the meal. However according to that logic you should say both paragraphs when Purim goes into Shabbos?

B. There is a rabbinic concept called Tosefes Shabbos, adding on to the Shabbos before and after.

Answer: On Shabbos going into Rosh Chodesh there is actually additional minutes going into Rosh Chodesh so can say that when bentching it was for one half of the meal and then for the other half because Shabbos could have been pushed off longer to when they were ready to bentch and then it leads into Rosh Chodesh but once nightfall comes Purim is done and over, even if the meal started during the day so when bentching it is only Shabbos therefore only the paragraph of Shabbos is said. (See Dirshu Mishna Berura note 32 in 695:3:15.)

Torah Riddles Test #21

  1. Question: Why isn’t a Megillah muktzah, according to the Pri Megadim and Elya Rabba, if Shushan Purim falls out on Shabbos just as a lulav and esrog on Shabbos Sukkos or a shofar on Shabbos Rosh HaShana?

Background:

A. The Mishna Berura (688:6:15) explains the reason why they don’t read Megillah on Shabbos of Purim mishulash is because the Rabbis decreed not to lest someone will go to a sage to learn how to read it and will walk four amos in the public domain.

B. The Pri Chodosh argues and says a Megillah is muktzah on the Shabbos of Shushan Purim (mishulash) because since one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of Megillah on that day then he takes his mind away from using it and makes it muktzah in his eyes.

Answer: It is a Sefer, or scroll which people can learn from, so just like any other time of the year one can use it even in Shabbos so to on this Shabbos as well it is not muktzah and could be used if you want to look something up or learn from it. But a shofar is an instrument and a lulav has no use besides for the mitzvah so they are muktzah on Shabbos.

Torah Riddles Test #20

  1. Question: What is the difference between kilayim (grafting or planting to fruits together of different species) and cooking meat and milk together?

Background:

  1. Tosfos in Yevamos 83a says that if one runs a grape vine over his friends wheat field, since one cannot forbid(ruin halachically) something which is not his then it is not considered kilayim and everything is permitted. The Talmud Yerushalmi holds his own grapes are forbidden but his friend’s wheat are permitted.
  2. Rav Elchanan Wasserman asks on this Yerushalmi in his Kovetz Haaros (piece 549) from a case of cooking a non-shechted properly animal (neveila) in milk, where the halacha is the milk is not forbidden for since cooking milk and meat does not apply to a neveila (non-kosher animal) because one prohibition can’t be stacked on a another prohibition, so so to the milk is also not forbidden, for since the prohibition of cooking milk and meat come from both sides combined and one side is not prohibited so the other side is also no prohibited.
  3. If that is the case that should be true by the forbidden mixture f kilayim, if one is not prohibited the other one should not become prohibited as well, question on the Yerushalmi?!
  4. Milk and meat create a new entity
  5. Or (a second answer) there is a difference between the concepts of “no prohibition can stack on another prohibition” vs. “a person can’t forbid something which is not his.”

Answer: . (1) Milk and meat when mixed prohibitively become a new entity so they are either both prohibited as a new entity or both permitted because they never really mixed. (2) Rav Elchanan’s answer was that the axiom “a person can’t forbid something which is not his” (ein adam oser davar she’eino shelo) only applies to his friend but that does not mean his own thing can’t be negatively affected. But the axiom “no prohibition can stack on another prohibition” (ein issur chal al issur) dictates that if the second prohibition can’t go into effect because of the first prohibition then it does go into effect at all, even to affect the milk.

Torah Riddles Test #19

  1. Question: If a person sells an ox to his friend and it is found to be a treifa why is it a faulty sale (mekach ta’us), maybe it will live, who cares if most of them will die, there is a halachic rule that we don’t go by the majority when it comes to monetary cases?

Background:

The answer is not like the Hafla’ah said in Kesubos 15b that once we rely on a majority to answer a prohibition question then we can use that majority to answer a monetary question, meaning because the majority will say whether it is kosher or not it can now poskin whether it is a mekach ta’us (faulty sale). The reason why this answer does not hold up is because many halachic authorities disagree with it.

The halacha of mekach ta’us (faulty sales) is dependent on the will or mindset of a person

Answer: We can assume that a person does not want or agree to buy an animal which is now a treifa since most of the time it will die and only the minority will stay alive.

Torah Riddles Test #18

  1. Question: Why does Rashi say that the oil is the main ingredient of anigron, a liquid type of throat lozenge, only because there is more oil than beet juice but when one eats an olive in order to subdue the harshness of a radish that is enough of a reason to say the blessing is on the radish?

Background:

 A. The Gemara in Brachos 36a says a mixture of oil and beet juice use to be taken to soothe sore throats and the blessing was on the oil (which has a special blessing).

B. Rashi says the reason the blessing is on the oil is because there is a lot more oil than beet juice. Rabbeinu Yonah says the reason why the blessing is on the oil is because that is the main ingredient and the beet juice is only mixed in because it is dangerous to drink oil by itself.

C. Rashi in Brachos 41a says if one eats an olive just to cool down his mouth after he ate a radish he does not need to say a blessing on the olive because the radish was the main food but the olive was just to cool down the sharpness of the radish.

D. Why isn’t Rashi consistent with his rule that if one eats one thing just so that he can eat another then the blessing is only needed on the main food he wants not the food that helps him eat it?

[Expand]

Answer: This rule only applies when eating two food separately one after the other but if they are mixed together like the beet juice and oil one would think that the beet juice is the main drink if there is little oil and the blessing is on the beet juice, only because there is more oil than beet juice is why we say a blessing on the oil. [/expand]

Torah Riddles Test #17

  1. Question: Why does the judge only have to write up the claims and final decision but not the proofs and logic behind the decision if a litigant wants to take the case to an appeals court?

Background:

a. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 14:4) says in the Rema: “When they have to write for him the reason why he was judged there is no set time to do it, rather whenever he has a chance he writes it and gives it to him. He does not need to write the reasons or proofs; he only has to write for them the claims and final decision.

Answer: The Sma (26) says that every good court, when they hear the claims, knows how to come out with the proper decision because all Jews have one Torah.

Torah Riddles Test #16

  1. Question: Why do you need to check on all the mezuzahs of your house and can’t rely on a chazaka after 3 of them are still found to be kosher?


Background:

A. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 291:1) says an individual household should check there mezuzahs twice every 7 years and mezuzahs of the public twice every fifty years.

B. A chazaka is an assumption or pattern that is established after 3 times so if 3 mezuzahs were found to be kosher why can’t one assume that all the rest of his mezuzahs in his house are kosher?

Answer:The Birkay Yosef and Pischei Teshuva (1) both say that you have to check all the mezuzahs put up the same time as the 3 because not all the locations are the same, environment differences, colder, warmer, rain, snow, etc.